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The Temptation to Intervene
Richard M illett

braham Lowenthal of
FDR him self used the threat o f over
the Inter-American
whelming military force to prom ote
Dialogue once sug
the ouster of Cuban dictator
gested that U nited
G erardo Machado. Trum an consid
States policy toward
ered sending troops into Colombia
Latin America could
during the 1948 Bogota riots, but
be sum m ed up in two popular
slo refrained from such action.
wisely
gans: A rpege’s “prom ise them any
Eisenhower tu rn ed to proxy forces
thing,” and Hallm ark's “when you
supported by the CIA to oust the
care enough to send the very best.”
Arbenz regim e in Guatemala.
By the latter, Lowenthal was refer
Kennedy used the threat o f force to
ring to o ur repeated tendency to dis
pressure the Trujillo family out of
patch the Marines a n d /o r other ele
the Dom inican Republic, launched
m ents of our arm ed forces to Latin
an unsuccessful exile invasion of
America, ostensibly to prom ote the
Cuba, and barely avoided arm ed
region’s own best interests.
intervention in Haiti. Lyndon
The tem ptation to use military
Johnson sent the military into the
force, directly or indirectly, in an
Dom inican Republic and dispatched
effort to resolve o ur problem s in the
naval units to the coast of Brazil to
Western H em isphere has afflicted
encourage a military coup in that
most 20th century presidents.
nation. Nixon preferred a covert
T heodore Roosevelt used military
style in operations as dem onstrated
force to reoccupy Cuba and to
in his prom otion of the 1973 coup
secure Panam a’s separation from
in Chile. C arter actually opposed
Colombia. Taft sent the Marines to
military intervention, although he
Nicaragua. Wilson occupied Haiti
did lobby for the dispatch of an OAS
and the Dom inican Republic, and
force to Nicaragua. Reagan suffered
sent troops to Cuba, Panama, and
from no such inhibitions, interven
twice into Mexico. Coolidge
ing in Grenada, prom oting the
launched the second US occupation
C ontra war in Nicaragua, and send
o f Nicaragua and em broiled the
ing massive military aid to El Sal
Marines in a prolonged guerrilla
vador. Bush invaded Panam a and
struggle with the forces of General
Clinton, of course, sent US troops
Augusto Cesar Sandino.
into Haiti.
Beginning with Franklin
W hat is perhaps most notable
Roosevelt, the U nited States regular
about this dreary list is that direct,
ly prom ised to end the use o f mili
unilateral intervention has become
tary intervention, but these promises
increasingly unpalatable and recent
have been h o nored m ore in their
presidents have increasingly turned
breach than in their observance.
to thinly veiled covert operations or
have sought multilateral support for
US operations. Enthusiasm for any
Richard Millett is a historian of the
prolonged military presence has also
military in Latin America. He is cur
waned, especially in Congress, which
rently senior research associate at the
has frequently sought to place limits
Washington office of the North-South
on the use o f military force. The
Center.
American public also seems increas
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ingly disenchanted with military
intervention as an instrum ent of for
eign policy, especially since the
unhappy outcom e of US involve
m ent in Somalia. T here may now be
even less enthusiasm for multilateral
interventions than for unilateral
operations, a tone reflected in the
policy pronouncem ents o f some
congressional leaders.
O ne factor in this may be the per
vasive power o f television, what
Ambassador Clovis Maksoud of The
American University has described
as the “CNNization o f the world.”
T he defects and dangers o f military
operations are graphically presented
in a way that overwhelms any
abstract argum ents as to their poten
tial long range benefits. Com bined
with this is the im pact of the Cold
W ar’s end. Interventions were justi
fied for decades as being necessary
to com bat some international m en
ace to US security. Today, such m en
aces seem largely absent from the
hem isphere. President Bush
invoked fear o f narcotics trafficking
as a justification for invading
Panama, but the failure o f that oper
ation to produce any im pact on
Am erica’s domestic dru g problem
has underm ined future use of that
rationale.
The military is also less than
enthusiastic about such operations.
Fearing involvement in unpopular
and prolonged missions and viewing
the Western H em isphere as a m inor
area in their global responsibilities,
the overwhelming majority of senior
com m anders do whatever they can
do to discourage the political leader
ship from direct interventions.
While searching for new missions in
the post-Cold War world, most offi
cers rem ain unconvinced that

N
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Old habits die hard

nation-building in small, poor coun
tries is a desirable one.
Like many contem porary issues,
m ilitary intervention produces
m uch stronger negative than posi
tive reactions. Critics find it easy to
organize opposition, elicit public
fears and, often, set the term s of the
public policy debate. Apprehensive
over offending any m ajor ethnic or
o th er pressure group, most politi
cians hesitate to call for the use of
m ilitary force, preferring to let the
potential onus for any such deci
sions fall on the executive branch.
Despite such inhibitions, the
tem ptation to intervene endures.
While fearing negative public reac
tions to the use of force, m ost presi
dents are equally concerned about

appearing unable to respond to
upheavals in what is still widely per
ceived as Am erica’s backyard. While
most recognize that Latin Americans
have both the right and the capacity
to m anage their own affairs, the
em otional force of Am erican pater
nalism has not disappeared. Many
on the right still see Latin America
as a m ixture of Desi Arnaz, Carm en
M iranda, and assorted baseball play
ers, em otionally unstable and in
need of US tutelage, by force if nec
essary, in order to handle their own
affairs. O n the left, opposition to
intervention is stronger, bu t can
almost disappear in situations where
past US policies are cited as the
cause of current oppression. Haiti
provided a clear exam ple of the

capacity of guilt to overcome m uch
of the opposition to intervention.
Despite growing criticism over the
results of such operations, Haiti is
unlikely to be the last arm ed US in
tervention. Force rem ains a ready
alternative to frustrated leaders, es
pecially when measures such as eco
nom ic sanctions fail to produce the
desired results. Indeed, reliance on
such measures, which are deceptive
ly easy to initiate, but are rarely suc
cessful and can be abandoned only
at considerable political cost, may
actually increase the chances of an
ultim ate resort to force. The refrain
o f Tom L eh rer’s satirical song from
the 1960s, “when in doubt, send the
M arines,” rem ains an ap t expression
of the tem ptation to intervene. ■
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C om m entary

As the Rio Grande Wanes
Aaron Segal

he im plem entation of
Com m unity follows a similar pat
the N orth Am erican
tern.
Free Trade A greem ent
M exico’s long-term challenge is
to provide em ploym ent for the one
(NAFTA) has resulted
m illion citizens who jo in the work
in an impressive
force each year, most o f whom have
increase in trade
less than a fourth grade education.
between Mexico an d the US. New
Currently, 18-25 year-olds suffer
jo b s are being gen erated— in the
from massive unem ploym ent and
US, prim arily in high technology
underem ploym ent. NAFTA is
exports; in Mexico, mainly in
regard ed by many Mexicans as the
assembly plants and services—
only option for generating invest
reflecting the fact that at the onset
m ent, technology transfers, and
o f NAFTA, average Mexican tariffs
jobs.
had com e down to a level slightly
below those of the US. At the same
time, jobs, mostly o f the unskilled
an d semi-skilled variety, are being
lost on both sides of the b o rd er
Although immigrants may
because labor is a significant por
be friends and relatives,
tion o f total production cost.
MexicanAmericans
NAFTA, however, opens banking,
insurance, trucking, and o ther
of all social strata are
highly p ro tected sectors in Mexico
increasingly supportive of
for the first time. R esponding to
these new opportunities, US firms
tough border policing.
are m aking new investments, m erg
ers, an d acquisitions. A few
M exican com panies, like Vidrios de
M onterrey, have invested in the US
NAFTA reverses the historic rela
tionship between the US and
to acquire technology and sales net
works.
Mexico while creating what econo
T he risks from NAFTA are m uch
mist Sidney W eintraub calls a
g reater in Mexico than in the US,
“m arriage of convenience.” W hat
yet no significant opposition has
NAFTA portends for relations
em erged. M exican trade agree
between Mexicans and Mexicanm ents with C entral and South
A m ericans has yet to be exam ined.
Am erica have b ro u g ht few concrete
T he key issue dividing Mexicans
benefits. M exican trade with Japan
and M exican-Americans will contin
consists largely o f selling petroleum
ue to be m igration. Both Mexico
for m anufactured products, and
City and W ashington agreed in
trade with the E uropean
advance to exclude it from the
NAFTA negotiations, bu t NAFTA is
likely to increase M exican expecta
tions and awareness o f wage and
Aaron Segal is professor of political
jo b opportunities in the US.
science at the University of Texas at
Meanwhile, im m igration from
El Paso.
Mexico is changing in response to a

T
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decade o f econom ic stagnation at
hom e and an A m erican econom y
which continues to grow at a m od
est pace. U ndocum en ted an d legal
Mexican im m igrants are m ore and
m ore reuniting their families with
the intention o f staying in the US.
T he practice o f young Mexican
m en entering the US as tem porary
workers and sending substantial
rem ittances to their families across
the b o rd e r is declining.
Em igration to the US is im por
tant to Mexico as an escape hatch
for an estim ated five p er cent o f the
total Mexican labor force. It also
accounts for well over one billion
dollars a year in rem ittances, m uch
o f it to distressed rural areas. Even
with NAFTA’s increased trade,
Mexico has no alternative to these
US jobs and dollars. Scholars of
Mexican im m igration argue that
Mexican m igrants fill low-wage jobs
which few Am ericans consider
accepting. They also cite the h ard 
ships e n d u red by Mexican im m i
grants as fu rth er p ro o f th at they are
filling a vacuum in the US econo
my.
Mexican-Americans, especially in
the b o rd e r areas, view legal and
u n d o cum ented im m igrants as
direct com petitors for scarce and
low-paying unskilled jobs in con
struction, farm labor, and the ser
vice sector. A lthough im m igrants
may be friends and relatives,
M exican-Americans o f all social
strata are increasingly supportive of
tough b o rd er policing measures.
Social mobility am ong low-income
M exican-Americans is so slow that
they are b o u n d to regard new immi
grants as an econom ic threat.
T here are few good ideas about
what to do in regard to im m igra

C om m entary

What integration means for Mexicans and Mexican-Americans

tion from Mexico. T he proponents
o f tem porary M exican m igrant
w orker schem es along the lines of
the 1942-54 Bracero A greem ent
face intense anti-im m igration senti
m en t in the US and deep ambiva
lence in Mexico. T he E uropean
Com m unity and the Japanese have
experienced tem porary guest-worker program s and have found that
preventing these guest workers
from staying is extrem ely difficult.
M easures to tighten US b o rd e r con
trols an d require US identity cards
as a condition o f obtaining employ
m en t are expensive, cum bersom e
to enforce, and unlikely to be effec
tive.
E nvironm ental problem s along
the US-Mexico b o rd er are building
up as an o th er im p ortant and divi
sive issue. In spite o f com m itm ents
m ade by the NAFTA add-on agree
m ents, i.e., the establishm ent o f a
bilateral environm ental commis
sion, little is likely to be accom 
plished. Mexico lacks the public
funds, trained staff, and political
will to tackle the im m ense problem s
on its side o f the border. These
problem s worsen on a daily basis as
p o o r m igrants from the interior
p o u r into M exico’s b o rd er cities.
Mexican officials give the highest
priority to the m ore expensive and
com plex water, air pollution,
sewage, and o th er environm ental
problem s of Mexico City.
T he population on the US side of
the b o rd e r lacks political clout in
W ashington and state capitals.
T hough public spending on envi
ro n m en tal clean-ups could boost
the b o rd e r econom ies, the m oney is
m ore likely to be a trickle than a
flood. T he prospects are slim for
cross-border coalitions o f p oor peo-

P r o p o s it io n 1 8 7

Ballot initiative 187’s overw helm ing victory in the Novem ber 1994
C alifornia elections was also a shocking defeat for the de facto coali
tion o f Mexican-American organizations an d the Mexican govern
m ent. Fierce statem ents by Mexican officials, organized dem onstra
tions in Mexico, vivid coverage o f the bitter cam paign in the
Mexican m edia, and mass rallies by Hispanic high school students
failed to produce a high M exican-American voter turn o u t. Large
num bers o f them did n o t register to vote or stayed at hom e. Those
who did vote evinced support for Proposition 187, which would
deny non-em ergency social services to persons found to be in the
US illegally.
While US courts adjudicate the constitutionality o f Proposition 187,
the Mexican governm ent o f Ernesto Zedillo is also being challenged
on its own im m igration laws and practices, which fall m ost heavily
on G uatem alan and Salvadoran illegals. Meanwhile there appears
to be insufficient political su p p o rt in Florida o r Texas— two o th er
states with high im m igrant populations— to introduce 187-type ini
tiatives. ■

pie who are the m ost h u rt by bur
geoning environm ental crises.
T here are scores o f o th er issues—
from m onetary policy and
exchange rates to civil aviation and
tourism — bu t no n e im pact on rela
tions between Mexicans and
M exican-Americans like the envi
ro n m en t and im m igration. Like
everything else, attitudes o f
Mexicans and Mexican-Americans
are changing. Mexicans increasing
ly view their northerly com patriots
as a potential consum er m arket and
political ally. Mexican-Americans
are beginning to take pride in an
industrialized, urban Mexico which
values its culture, as opposed to
feeling sadness for a land o f pover
ty, repression, and injustice. By

accelerating contact o f all kinds,
NAFTA accelerates these attitudinal
changes. ■
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The Message of the Media
Gonzalo Soruco

ress coverage o f Latin
America has been notori
ously poor in the twenti
eth century. For decades
the US m edia conde
scendingly portrayed the
region through stereotypes. News
o f crises dom inated. While the
inform ation revolution, the end of
the Cold War, and the D ecem ber
1994 Sum m it of the Americas have
n o t changed the quality of that cov
erage, there has been a change in
its focus. Less driven by crisis,
today’s coverage o f the region has
en tered the new era of drug news.

P

T h e P r ess

and the

G ood N

e ig h b o r

At a press conference on January
20, 1940, President Roosevelt ex
pressed his adm inistration’s new
approach to trading with Latin
America: “Give them [the Latin
Americans] a share. They think they
are ju st as good as we are, and many
o f them are.” Roosevelt’s patroniz
ing rem arks about Latin America
fell on d eaf ears th at day, since
no n e o f the journalists present con
sidered it worthy enough to report.
T he “share” to which FDR
referred encom passed both deci
sion-making authority in interAm erican econom ic debates as well
as a portion o f the wealth derived
from the exploitation o f Latin
Am erican natural resources, m ost of

Gonzalo Soruco teaches mass commu
nication at the University of Mia mi.
He is the author of The Cuban
Exiles o f Florida and the Mass
Media: The Struggle of Culture
(Gainesville: University Presses of
Florida, forthcoming).
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which went to US investors. FDR
had good reasons for the new poli
cy: the G reat Depression had no t yet
abated in the US; Europe was at
war; and the Axis powers were eye
ing the m arkets o f Latin America.
T he Latins themselves were showing
some m ettle in their disputes with
W ashington; Bolivia and Mexico
had nationalized Standard O il’s
assets and were threatening to sell
their energy resources to Germ any
a n d Jap an .

The US press’s short-sighted
view of Latin America has
not changed much. Many
newspaper editors still feel
that the region is not worthy
of serious press coverage.

C ontrary to FDR’s wishes, US
investors were in no m ood to share
anything with Latin America. In a
letter to Josephus Daniels, then US
am bassador to Mexico, Wall Street
pun d it B ernard B aruch voiced the
investors’ concern. “I think we
ought to help the poor peons of
Mexico,” B aruch wrote, “but I am
sure that the taking away o f the
Am erican m arkets by the sweated
labor o f the Nazi and Fascist coun
tries will destroy the labor standards
in this country.”
It is unlikely that B aruch’s unkind
reference to the people o f Mexico
—had journalists been aware of it—
would have m ade it into the newspa
pers. T he US press in those days
was largely oblivious, if n o t con

tem ptuous, o f anything or anybody
south of the border. In fact, the
press was often the source of nega
tive publicity surrounding Latin
America.
T h e P r e ss

and the

S u m m it

Over five decades, the US press’s
short-sighted view o f Latin America
has n o t changed m uch. Many news
paper editors still feel that the re
gion is no t worthy of serious press
coverage. T he Summit o f the
Americas held in Miami (D ecem ber
9-11, 1994) is a case in point. O f
the 5,000 journalists covering the
event, only a few were from the US;
and while that handful included the
entire W hite House press corps, few
m ajor newspapers m entioned the
event. Moreover, non e o f the televi
sion networks m ade a serious effort
to cover the Summit. Brit H um e of
ABC News, for exam ple, broadcast
from the Sum m it’s International
M edia C enter and rep o rted about
events in Bosnia. It is n o t surprising
then, that there are as many myths,
stereotypes, and half-truths about
Latin Am erica in the pages of US
newspapers today, as there were
four, six, even eight decades ago.
O f course, one could argue that,
historically, the US press has tended
to ignore Latin America. U nable to
understand and unwilling to learn
about the com plex tapestry o f peo
ples, cultures, and character that
make up the Americas, the US press
has often resorted to the stereotype,
the catchy phrase, or superficial
analysis of events in the region.
US new spaper reportage o f the
o ther Americas has always had a
sensationalistic slant. U ntil a de
cade ago, the reg io n ’s earthquakes,
floods, and revolutions were the
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The region as caricature

standard news fare that readers got
from the US press. Crisis news, as
these stories are called, featured col
orful descriptions o f the region’s
poverty, its unhealthy living condi
tions, or its tendency to civil unrest.
M ore cu rren t coverage dwells on
the war on drugs, cocaine, and drug
trafficking. Regardless, this type of
news coverage has the unfortunate
tendency to reinforce stereotypes
that readers hold about the region.
Small and less developed nations
have always received the worst cov
erage. Editorial cartoons portrayed
them as unruly children being suf
fered by a tolerant and always
benevolent Uncle Sam. Central
Am erican countries were often
referred to as “banana republics”
and their leaders as “tin h o rn dicta
tors.” Panam a was depicted as a
barefoot, mischievous, and heedless
child playing with a can o f gasoline,
ever ready to start a fire. Nicaragua
was the gun-toting baby whose cries
kept Uncle Sam awake at night.
T hough m ore distant, South
America did n o t fare any better at
the hands (or typewriters) of US
journalists. Brazil was the place
where E uropean and N orth
Am erican villains sought sanctuary.
A rgentina was a Nazi haven. Bolivia
was the am using little country with
two capitals and m ore attem pted
coups than years o f independence.
F r o m C r is is

to

D rugs

Past and present coverage of
Bolivia highlights the brief and
superficial n atu re o f US news. Its
revolutionary history is rarely m en
tioned anym ore and crisis news is
the exception rath er than the rule,
b u t the new trends are no better
than those they replaced.

An analysis o f news stories in The
Atlanta Constitution, The Boston Globe,
The Chicago Tribune, the Christian
Science Monitor, the Los Angeles Times,
The New York Times, Washington Post,
and Wall Street Journal suggests that
US journalists and their editors have
becom e m ore aware of Bolivia.
While m entions o f the country were
scarce ten years ago, the analysis
shows that Bolivia m ade the papers
on 427 occasions between January
1989 and Ju n e 1994 in news stories,
editorials, features, or in some other
context. T he nu m b er of appear
ances places Bolivia ahead of
Uruguay, Ecuador, and Paraguay
and behind A rgentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela in
the US news. If new spaper editors
em ployed dem ographic criteria,
such as population size, to re p o rt on
a country, Bolivia would be reason
ably represented by these num bers.
In fact, editors’ criteria for what is
news defy quick and easy explana
tions. Im portant markets, politics,
or issues that directly affect the US
stimulate interest in varying
degrees. Geographic proxim ity is
im portant too. Mexico (a m ajor
trading p artn e r o f the US) m ade
the headlines 8,837 times, m ore
often than any o ther Latin
Am erican country. NAFTA and
Chiapas, which have caused a great
deal o f concern in W ashington, are
undoubtedly reflected in these num 
bers. El Salvador and Guatem ala
were m entioned 2,750 and 694
times respectively, largely as a result
of the insurgencies and the unfold
ing peace processes in both coun
tries. The Haitian crisis, followed
by the stam pede o f refugees to
Florida’s shores, got Haiti into the
press 2,087 times.

T he recent increase in coverage
of Bolivia can be explained by the
US obsession with the war on drugs
in source countries. O f the 427
news stories that m entioned Bolivia,
42 percent were about the p roduc
tion and trafficking of cocaine. In
roughly half o f those stories, the
focus was on the effects o f cocaine
on crime, the economy, and co rru p 
tion in the US, rath er than on
Bolivia itself. Each article elaborat
ed, sometimes at length, on the role
of Bolivia and its neighbors in p ro
ducing and distributing cocaine,
and on the devastating effects o f the
drug on US society. Even w hen the
story rep o rted on harm less aspects
o f the coca leaf, such as its use in
the innocuous beverage known as
“m ate de coca,” journalists found a
way to work in com m ents on the
dangers o f cocaine addiction.
To be sure, Bolivia’s connection
with drugs is overdone in the US
press. O f the 2,200 news stories
about Colom bia published in the
aforem entioned eight papers, 40
percent were on cocaine trafficking
and production, while only 20 per
cent o f the 1,450 stories about Peru
were on the same topic. Yet both of
these countries play a greater role
in the production, transportation
and sale o f cocaine than Bolivia
does. Bolivia is now the second
largest producer of cocaine
hydrochloride but has fallen to
third place (behind Colombia) in
the production o f coca leaf.
The overstated connection
between Bolivia and drugs is n o t
lim ited to the papers surveyed
above. A quick review of the Miami
Herald's 1989-1993 database reveals
that drugs and Bolivia appear in 16
percent o f the p ap e r’s news stories;
Hemisphere • Volume Six, Number Three
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drugs an d Colom bia appear in 14
p ercen t of the news stories; and
drugs and P eru appear in only eight
percent of the news stories. These
trends suggest that when editors
assign reporters to write a story on
Bolivia, the topic o f drugs is implic
itly included. Similarly, when the
story is about drugs, editors call for
an inclusion of Bolivia as one of the
principal sources. Either way, the
repeated connection of Bolivia with
drugs is certain to affect US public
opinion.
Who reports on Bolivia and on
what topic is also a source o f con
cern. T he newspapers m entioning
Bolivia m ost often are The New York
Times, followed by the Los Angeles
Times, The Washington Post, and the
Christian Science Monitor. At the bot
tom o f the list are The Wall Street
Journal, The Chicago Tribune, The
Boston Globe, and The Atlanta
Constitution. O f these The
Washington Post published the
greatest pro p o rtio n o f stories (70
percent) connecting Bolivia with
drugs, followed by The Boston Globe
(58 percent) and The Atlanta
Constitution (45 p ercen t). The Wall
Street Journal linked Bolivia and
drugs in only eight percent of its
stories. O n the o th er hand, 24 per
cent o f The New York Times stories on
Bolivia were on politics, while 31
p ercen t of the Journal s were about
the economy.
T he switch from crisis news to
d ru g news in the reporting practices
o f US newspapers has several impli
cations for Bolivia and other Latin
Am erican countries. As sources of
crisis news, these countries were
peripheral to US interests and secu
rity; as such, they received little
attention. Political instability and
violence were largely a source of
am usem ent to US readers. As the
source o f a d ru g th at affects the
daily lives of US citizens and their
institutions, Bolivia, Colombia, and
P eru have em erged onto a new and
m ore om inous ground. ■
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R eports: Peru

Local Boy Makes Good
M aria Teresa Romero

F

ollowing an exhaustive
purge o f the voter rolls,
the period for declaring
candidacy for the up
com ing Peruvian presi
dential elections ended
with a bang. O f the 27 prelim inary
groups aspiring to take part in the
race, twelve were elim inated. The
rem aining fifteen will square off in
the April 9 elections.
T he m ost notable of the excluded
parties was Agrupacion Siglo XXI,
headed by Susana Higuchi, the
estranged wife of the incum bent
President Alberto Fujimori. H er
candidacy was disqualified because
she allegedly could not present the
requisite n um ber of signatures need
ed to register h er political organiza
tion with the Jurado Nacional de
Elecciones (JNE). Ms. Higuchi
appealed the JN E ’s decision and
threatened to organize protest
m arches all over Peru, but the JNE
left h er out of the presidential race,
and avoided ruling on the legality of
h er candidacy.
O f the twelve eligible parties, the
presidential race is likely to come
down to two candidates: President
Fujimori of Cambio 90/Nueva
Mayoria, and the form er Secretary
G eneral of the U nited Nations,
Javier Perez de Cuellar o f Movimiento
Union par el Peru. The power of the
incum bency has allowed Fujimori,
particularly since he began exercis
ing extraordinary executive powers
on April 5, 1992, to m ount a re-election campaign touting his two major
achievements— the econom ic recov-

Maria Teresa Romero is a freelance jour
nalist and teaches international relations
at the Universidad Central de Venezuela.

ery and the pacification o f the coun
try—both of which have encouraged
Peruvians to believe that they are
headed for a period o f some tran
quillity.
Favoring Javier Perez de Cuellar is
the generally negative view (held by
60% of the poorest sectors, accord
ing to one poll) o f official economic
adjustm ent policies, and, to a lesser
extent, the perception that the gov
ern m en t is no t dem ocratic. Perez
de Cuellar has spent m uch of his
time searching for solutions to
poverty, attacking Fujim ori’s authori
tarianism, and advocating decentral
ization o f power.

Toledo seeks to replicate
the Fujimori phenomenon.
O ne other candidate complicates
the strategies o f the two front ru n 
ners, m uddying the electoral waters.
This is Alejandro Toledo M anrique,
who heads Pais Posible, a group of
technocrats and entrepreneurs that
could fill the political center. “El
C holo” Toledo, as he is popularly
known in Peru, entered the com pe
tition in a surprising and even suspi
cious way: unable to come up with
enough signatures to make the first
cut, he was subsequently drafted by
the Coordinadora Democratica deJose
Barba Caballero, a party that was
already registered, to be its presiden
tial candidate. This turn of events
stirred rum ors that T oledo’s candi
dacy was nothing m ore than a
Fujimori strategy to erode support
for Perez de Cuellar, whose cam
paign is the only real challenge to
Fujimori.

This interpretation, which has
been pushed mainly by Perez de
Cuellar supporters, is viewed skepti
cally by many Peruvian political ana
lysts, who see T oledo’s candidacy as
a threat to Fujimori. Certainly, the
political profile of Toledo com petes
m ore with Fujimori than with Perez
de Cuellar. Alejandro Toledo
M anrique came from hum ble ori
gins, but m anaged to get work and
study abroad. A graduate o f the
University of San Francisco with
some postgraduate work at Stanford
(although his academ ic credentials
are in some question) Toledo held
im portant posts in international
organizations and was a consultant
to several governments. In other
words, he is the “poor ‘cholo’ who
trium phed abroad.” Moreover, he
is a young m an who is not linked to
the political parties and who em 
ploys a populist rhetoric in his
speeches calling for free education
for the poor, better jobs and wages,
and decentralization of the state. In
short, Toledo seeks to replicate the
Fujimori phenom enon.
It is doubtful that Toledo can win
the election. Am ong o th er factors
reducing his chances, he is not well
known outside o f Lima, and does
not have sufficient resources to ade
quately finance his campaign. How
ever, he could place third in a way
that would threaten both Fujimori
and Perez de Cuellar. A late 1994
poll gave Toledo a 61% favorable
rating am ong Lima residents, where
elections are usually decided. Re
gardless o f the outcom e, “el C holo”
Toledo adds some spice to the elec
toral scene in Peru, and has forced
each of the twelve candidates to
specify the content and message of
their program s and proposals. ■
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Balseros in Limbo
Carmelo Mesa-Lago

ditions. T he dem ographic features
pproxim ately every
o f these different waves o f em i
15 years Fidel Castro
grants diverged as well: balseros were
opens the island’s
overwhelmingly m ale (81% o f the
gates and allows
total) and young (86% u n d er 40
thousands of desper
years old). H ence the majority is
ate Cubans to em i
com posed of those who were born
grate to the U nited States: 5,000
and raised u n d er the revolution, a
from the P ort of Cam arioca in 1965,
clear indication o f the failure of
125,000 from Mariel in 1980, and
socialism and the alienation o f the
m ore than 32,000 from Cojim ar and
youth. T he 1994 exodus is also
m any o th er shores between August
im portant because it took place
an d Septem ber of 1994. Prior to
u n d er the devastating econom ic
the latest exodus, Cubans were
crisis that has afflicted Cuba in the
granted parolee status as political
1990s, and followed the massive
refugees and becam e eligible for
anti-governm ent riots in Havana
p erm an en t US residence after two
which occurred on August 5— the
years. Clinton dramatically changed
first u n d er the Revolution. Because
the previous policies and interned
o f these precarious political-ecothe em igrants in military camps at
nom ic conditions, it was initially
G uantanam o Naval Base and in
feared that the balsero exodus would
Panam a. Only 3 p ercent o f the em i
surpass all previous records.
grants in two US camps, having suc
cessfully reached Am erican shores,
were thereby eligible for parole.
A nother im p o rtant difference is
In a TV presentation on
that, in the two previous exoduses,
em igrants were picked up in Cuba
August 11, Castro rejected
by Cuban-Americans who had sailed
any possible negotiations
from US shores. In 1994, the em i
on the exodus unless the
grants fled in rudim entary rafts (bal
sas) risking their lives in the Straits
US embargo was lifted.
o f Florida. Ironically, the m ost
heroic em igrants were no t rewarded
with freedom and entry into the
Finally, C uba’s em igration wave
land o f honey b u t im prisoned in
occurred at the worst time for
deten tio n camps u n d er terrible conPresident Clinton and the city of
Miami. Popular support for the
president was at its lowest ebb, and
Carmelo Mesa-Lago is the Distinguished
he was in the midst o f preparing a
Service Professor of Economics and Latin
American Studies at the University of
reluctant Congress for an invasion
Pittsburgh. He is currently Mellon
o f Haiti. In the Novem ber elec
Visiting Professor at Florida International
tions, the Dem ocratic governor of
University, and most recently, the author
Florida faced a powerful challenge
of Breve historia econom ica de Cuba
from Republican Jeb Bush, who has
socialista (Madrid: Alianza Editorial,
close ties to the conservative sectors
1 9 9 4 .)
of M iami’s Cuban community. The
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city of Miami was counting on the
the D ecem ber Summit o f the
Americas, attended by all dem ocrati
cally elected heads o f state in the
hem isphere, to help erase the
adverse effects caused by crim e on
the lucrative tourist industry. These
factors shaped US and C uban posi
tions vis-a-vis the exodus, the negoti
ations, the bilateral agreem ent, and
its afterm ath.
C a st r o O

pens t h e

G a t e s A g a in

In a shrewd political m anipula
tion, an enraged Castro addressed
Cuba on national TV (also broad
cast by CNN) and blam ed the US
for the Havana riots. H e accused
the US governm ent of backing a
“subversive p lan ” to prom ote chaos
in the island. Tools o f th at plan
were the “blockade” (an econom ic
em bargo im posed in 1961, and
tightened in 1982 and 1992) and
the reduction in legal visas granted
to Cubans (the 1984 m igration
agreem ent, signed during the
Reagan adm inistration, stipulated a
m axim um o f 20,000 annual visas),
while stim ulating illegal departures
and hijackings of vessels.
Figures supplied by Cuba and the
US Im m igration and N aturalization
Service show that, in 1990, 83% of
arrivals had legal visas (2,274) while
17% (466) were illegal; such pro
portions shifted to 31% legal
(1,873) and 69% (4,169) illegal in
1993. Between Ju n e 4 and August
25, thirteen Cuban vessels were
seized by desperate Cubans and
taken to the U nited States; 41 died
when their vessel was sunk by gun
fire from Cuban coast guards, and
two C uban officers also died in the
hijackings. Castro threaten ed to
remove all obstacles to m igration
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Exodus redux

unless the US stopped encouraging
illegal departures. He did precisely
that, and the nu m ber of balseros
clim bed from 156 on August 13 to a
peak o f 3,253 on the 23rd. In a TV
presentation on August 11, Castro
rejected any possible negotiations
on the exodus unless the US em bar
go was lifted.
C l in t o n C o u n t e r s

Clinton charged that the causes of
both the riot and the exodus were
C astro’s disastrous econom ic poli
cies com bined with the lack of
democracy, political freedom s, and
hum an rights. He pledged that
Castro would n o t dictate US immi
gration policy. US im m igration offi
cials argued that the 20,000 visas
were not a m andatory quota bu t a
maxim um, and th at the low num ber
o f visas actually granted was due to
the fact that few Cuban-Americans
requested them for their relatives.
Clinton ord ered the US Coast
G uard to detain any vessel depart
ing from or retu rn in g to US shores
with Cubans, and set severe sanc
tions for the violators; both actions
effectively im peded an o th er Marieltype exodus. H e also ordered that
all rafters be intercepted by the US
Coast G uard and taken to
G uantanam o d etention camps or
o th er “safe havens” (eventually
P anam a); those detained would
never be allowed to en ter the US,
unless they w ent back to Cuba and
applied for a visa there.
This m easure provoked strong
opposition from C uban exiles who
claim ed th at Clinton was penalizing
the victims instead o f Castro. T he
president m et with the governor of
Florida, Miami officials and Jorge
Mas Canosa, the chairperson o f the

powerful Cuban-American National
Foundation (CANF). Mas advised
Clinton to be tough with Castro:
ban all dollar rem ittances and trips
to and from Cuba by exiles and
their relatives, and im pose a naval
blockade of the island. Except for
the blockade, Clinton followed that
advice, and increased Radio Marti
transmissions to Cuba. T he day the
num ber o f rafters peaked, Leon
Panetta declared that the blockade
option was u n d er consideration.
T here were rum ors that the Summit
would be moved from Miami to
W ashington DC, and any Clinton
initiative on Haiti was paralyzed.

him, referred to the adverse effects
o f both C linton’s m easures and the
exodus, such as negative coverage
by the international news media,
and the risks for both countries in
continuing along the path o f con
frontation. (Nevertheless the
Maximum Leader did n o t m ention
what were probably the worst effects
o f the unstable situation he h ad cre
ated with the exodus: a significant
decline in tourism and a chill in for
eign investm ent.) Finally, Castro
d ropped his previous dem and that
bilateral negotiations be tied to the
em bargo issue and agreed to discuss
only m igration issues.
T h e M ig r a t io n A g r e e m e n t

The day the number of
rafters peaked, Leon
Panetta declared that
the blockade option was
under consideration.

Surprisingly, Castro was silent for
two weeks while C linton’s tough
m easures were announced and
im plem ented. O n August 24,
Castro reappeared on C uban TV
with his attitude dramatically
changed from threatening to concil
iatory. H e stated that it was no t his
purpose to h u rt Clinton or the
Democrats, and com plained that
the US president had done the
exact opposite o f what he, Castro,
had suggested (and no t anticipat
ed) : tightening the em bargo, autho
rizing m ore radio transmissions, and
leveling the th reat of a naval block
ade. Castro, and the C uban jo u rn al
ists who posed bland questions to

The conversations were held in
New York from Septem ber 1-9 in
the m idst of significant polarization.
Conservative groups o f Cuban exiles
(but n o t the CANF) dem onstrated
against the talks and in support of
the em bargo, and dem anded a
naval blockade of the island.
Conversely, the US liberal press, top
D em ocrat congresspersons, a few
groups of C uban exiles, and C uba’s
Catholic bishops along with some
dissident groups requested the
em bargo either be lifted or includ
ed as an issue in the negotiations.
T here where a few surprises:
B ernard Aronson, President B ush’s
Assistant Secretary of State for InterAm erican Affairs, and conservative
colum nist William Buckley jo in e d
the second group.
T he US team, led by Michael
Skol, offered to effectively grant
20,000 visas annually (a key point
in C astro’s criticism) but Ricardo
Alarcon, head of the C uban team,
dem anded 100,000. Alarcon also
pushed for both the US em bargo
Hemisphere • Volume Six, Number Three
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and C linton’s econom ic sanctions to
be included in the talks, but he was
rebuffed by Skol. T he C uban chief
negotiator then reduced his
dem and to 28,000 visas and US
recognition that the em bargo was a
major cause of the exodus, but
n o n e o f these requests was granted.
W ith no im m ediate settlem ent in
sight, Alarcon flew back to Havana
for what was predicted would be
several days of consultations with
Castro. Surprisingly, he retu rn ed
to New York in less than 24 hours
and signed the agreem ent on
Septem ber 9.
According to the bilateral agree
m ent, Cuba would take effective
measures, using mainly “persuasive
m ethods,” to stop “unsafe depar
tures.” T he US, in turn, agreed to
im pede entrance to (a) rafters
already in or going to camps outside
the US (who would then have to
re tu rn to Cuba in o rd er to apply for
a US visa); and (b) em igrants who
dep art through o th er “irregular"
(illegal) ways. In addition, the US
would grant a m inim um of 20,000
visas to Cubans w ithout relatives in
the US, plus an additional num ber
of visas to those with im m ediate rel
atives or who were currently on wait
ing lists. Both countries agreed to
cooperate to prevent illegal m igra
tion and hijacking o f vessels, and to
arrange a retu rn for the voluntary
re tu rn o f balseros.
T he Cuban governm ent effective
ly halted the exodus, which
declined from 1,000 on Septem ber
11 to zero in four days. T he US
enacted rules on O ctober 12 for
granting visas to five categories of
Cubans. They included broader
definitions of political refugees or
eligibility for family reunification,
and a lottery for those who do not
qualify for o th er categories.
B a l se r o s : T h e B ig L o ser s

T he awful conditions in
G uantanam o’s camps have been
confirm ed by the Catholic C hurch,
12 Hemisphere • Volume Six, Number Three

hum an rights organizations, Cuban
exiles, and the news media. The
camps are surrounded by barbed
wire (although the MPs do no t
carry gu n s); many o f the detained
children are sick; there is no ru n 
ning water in some camps and what
water is available is always warm;
and the m igrants are crowded in
tents with dirt floors, dusty and lack
ing in privacy. Worse than the phys
ical conditions is the sense of im po
tence and loss of hope. By midOctober, some 1,000 Cubans had
expressed a desire to retu rn and
about 50 had done so. Thousands
escaped briefly and a couple died in
the attem pt. These conditions led
to severe criticism and protests from
the m igrants and many groups out
side, particularly Cuban-Americans.
Conditions in the Panam anian

The balseros were the
big losers; they risked their
lives only to end up in
detention camps under
awful living conditions.

this step raised hope that the door
m ight be open for others to be
freed.
T he im pact o f the exodus on both
the governm ent and people of the
U nited States and Cuba is sum m a
rized in the inset. Clinton was able
to stop the exodus and get political
support at hom e but at the cost of
significant ethical and political con
cessions. Castro scored some
im portant political points (US sup
p o rt to im pede illegal departures
and hijackings), bu t suffered eco
nomically and got additional sanc
tions. He also lost face by settling
for considerably less than he initial
ly dem anded (including the lifting
o f the em bargo). US taxpayers paid
the cost of rescues at sea and will
foot the bill for the detention camps
and forthcom ing legal immigrants.
T he balseros were the big losers; they
risked their lives only to en d up in
detention camps u n d e r awful living
conditions. A trickle o f Cubans will
be lucky to leave their tragic island
with US visas in the future, but the
overwhelm ing majority will be worse
off than before the exodus due to
C linton’s econom ic sanctions.
L in g e r in g P r o blem s

camps were considerably improved;
nonetheless, a riot and escape
attem pts resulted in some casualties.
To improve conditions in
Guantanam o, an om budsm an (a
Cuban-American) was appointed,
and a tim etable for specific
im provem ents was publicized.
Several o f those m easures m aterial
ized but the om budsm an stepped
down after three m onths on the job.
Clinton eventually yielded (at least
partially) to the pressure and criti
cism and announced that unaccom 
panied children, those over 70 years
of age, and the chronically sick
would be granted admission to the
U nited States. These three groups
represented less than 1 percent of
the total m igrants in the camps, but

T he agreem ent touches sensible
issues and leaves some points u n an 
swered. The US hopes that Cubans
who try to escape through “irregu
lar” ways will be “p ersu ad ed ” n o t to
leave and treated in a hum ane m an
ner. W hat is the US going to do if
Castro uses force and incarcerates
the violators?
Yielding to pressure, Clinton has
already infringed on the agreem ent
by freeing some o f the rafters de
tained in G uantanam o’s camps and
he has prom ised C uban exiles that
o ther groups will be allowed to
en ter the US in the future. Such a
breach could provide an incentive
for Cubans to leave illegally (as
detention in G uantanam o would
cease to be a deterren t) or provide
Castro with an excuse to suspend

Reports: Cuba

the agreem ent and open the gates
for an o th er wave o f em igration. On
the o th er hand, if the bulk of rafters
is m aintained in detention in
Guantanam o, an increasing num ber
of them will ask to retu rn hom e,
and the likelihood of riots will
increase. The Cuban governm ent
has already said it cannot re-absorb
all the detainees, and has reserved
the right to authorize each case
individually. Those who m anage to
re tu rn will have n either a house nor
a jo b , and the governm ent or zeal
ous militants m ight treat them
harshly: actions which would pro
voke irritation and protests in the
US.
T he US has enacted regulations
for the im plem entation of the
agreem ent and created new and
b roader categories o f eligible
Cubans (including a lottery) for
im m igration visas; the US Interest
Section in Havana has also increased
its personnel. Despite these facilita
tions, the m inim um quota of 20,000
annual visas m ight not be met, giv
ing Castro a chance to charge the
US with violating the agreem ent.
If the econom ic deterioration
continues and o th er riots or hijack
ings occur, Castro m ight open the
safety valve again to export the dis
co ntent and divert attention from
domestic trouble. It is true that he
would pay a costly econom ic price
for an o th er exodus, but he m ight
extract additional political conces
sions. In spite o f his weakness, the
aging autocrat is remarkably
resilient and the 1994 exodus may
n o t be the last, unless the regim e is
overthrown and the direction of the
m igratory wave is reversed. ■

This article is a partial version of a
much larger work in progress. The
author acknowledges the valuable aid
of Francisco Santeiro.

I m pact

of the

Ex o dus

o n the

U

n it e d

S tates

Positive for the government. Clinton reacted firmly and ultimately stopped the exodus,
freeing him to occupy Haiti. He successfully supported Governor Lawton Chiles’ (D-FL)
November re-election bid and avoided moving the Summit to Washington. Neither Latin
American heads of state nor Cuban-Americans created problems during the Summit.
Clinton did not reverse economic sanctions against Castro, and rejected a discussion on
non-migration issues (e.g. the embargo). His policies were approved by a majority of the
American people (including many in Florida) who are increasingly opposed to illegal
immigration. Clinton also got the support of the conservative and powerful CANF.
Negative for the government. In spite of Clinton’s claim that Castro wouldn’t dictate
immigration policy, he ended up doing so. The naval blockade of Cuba was threatened
and dien swiftly withdrawn. Clinton stopped treating rafters as heroes, and joined Castro
to stop them from leaving. He also began prosecuting hijackers. He yielded to Castro’s
request for increased legal immigration. He became the target of human rights groups
inside and outside Cuba for sending balseros to Guantanamo and collaborating with
Castro. Cubans in Panamanian camps have rioted, and those in Guantanamo are a risk
for rebellion and showcase of discontent.
Positive for US taxpayers. Residents of Miami and Florida avoided massive, rapid, and
unscreened immigration similar to that of Mariel.
Negative for US taxpayers. Inflow of future legal immigrants will increase pressure on
Florida's crowded schools and hospitals. After a period of federal aid. the state and the
city of Miami will have to keep immigrants who are neither self-supporting nor have rela
tives. Taxpayers will continue to finance camps in Guantanamo and other safe havens.
Im pact

of the

Exodus

on

C uba

Positive for the government. Castro shifted world attention from the economic crisis and
political riots in Havana to the US embargo as the cause of the exodus. He forced the US
to change a 28-year-old Cuban immigration policy and support him in repressing illegal
departures and hijacking. He opened a safety valve for 31,500 malcontents and will
expand it by at least 20,000 legal migrants annually. He divided the exile community on
two issues: the admission of rafters into the US and the question of US-Cuban talks.
Negative for the government. The US embargo is still on and new sanctions are causing
economic and political damage, at least temporarily. The crisis also harmed tourism and
investment. Castro and Alarcon drastically reduced initial demands and settled for con
siderably less, e.g.. 20,000 instead of 100,000 visas, no lifting of Clinton’s sanctions, and no
discussion of the embargo. The Revolution’s image was further damaged by the specta
cle of 31,500 people, mostly young, leaving Cuba regardless of enormous risks (revealing
that, in spite of dire conditions, detention in Guantanamo was preferable to staying in
Cuba).
Positive for Cuban population. 31,500 were able to leave Cuba and at least 20,000 more
should receive legal visas annually in the future, with broader definitions of who is eligi
ble for political refugee status, a visa, or for family unification.
Negative for Cuban population. Many rafters died at sea; those who survived are de
tained in camps in Guantanamo and Panama, and can’t apply for entry to the US, but
must return to Cuba and apply for a legal visa there. The 28-year-old policy of special
treatment that allowed refugees to enter the US and become residents was terminated.
Cubans on the island lost remittances and visits from exiled relatives. Rafters’ wives and
children left behind in Cuba are in a worse situation than before the exodus. ■
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Moving Beyond Personalism
Orlando J. Perez

n May 8, 1994
Panam anians elected
a new president, two
vice presidents, 71
legislators, 511 com 
munity representa
tives, and 67 mayors. For Panama,
these elections constituted an
im portant step toward building a
dem ocratic system of governm ent.
They were the first in the history of
Panam a to be held u n d er a political
context prom oting free and com pet
itive elections.
Panam a’s structure of governm ent
and its political party system offer
obstacles to the developm ent and
consolidation of pluralistic institu
tions. The nation still operates
u n d er the 1972 Constitution,
reform ed in 1978 and 1983, which
was the p roduct and instrum ent of
the military regimes. To bring the
Constitution m ore in line with the
needs o f a dem ocratic governm ent,
a set o f reform s was subm itted to
the electorate in 1992. Eventually
defeated at the polls, the package
included a prohibition on the rais
ing o f an army; revisions to the elec
toral procedures for m em bers of
Congress; increased autonom y for
the Electoral Tribunal; and curbs on
the power of the C ontroller
General. Consequently, there has
been a growing m ovem ent to con
voke a C onstituent Assembly to draft
an entirely new docum ent. While
this may ultimately occur, the 1994
elections took place u n d e r the exist
ing charter. T he Constitution

Orlando J. Perez is visiting assistant pro
fessor of political science at the University
of Kansas at Lawrence.
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requires only a simple plurality for
election as president. With seven
candidates, this allowed the candi
date with a third of the votes to win.
The political context may be con
ducive to free and competitive elec
tions, but the weakness of the politi
cal party system is an obstacle to
dem ocratic consolidation. Political
parties in Panam a represent narrow
econom ic interests rather than
broad popular sectors. Given the
unrepresentative nature o f political
parties, political com petition
revolves around personalities.
The C onstitution requires that all
candidates for the Legislative
Assembly be on a list of approved
parties. In districts having only one
legislator, a simple plurality is
enough to win, but in others, such
as m etropolitan Panam a City, which
elects several legislators, the final
result is based on a com plicated for
m ula involving party lists and m odi
fied proportional representation.
T he result is virtually to guarantee a
divided Assembly in which the party
that wins the executive has a m inori
ty in the legislature. The Constitu
tion was designed to inhibit the
independence of all branches of
governm ent, leaving the military
and its party allies as the ultim ate
m oderating powers.
But with the elim ination o f the
military, there is no final arbiter, so
the system is characterized by grid
lock, partisanship, and instability.
The ability o f the new governm ent
to reduce these tendencies will
determ ine if the 1994 elections were
an opportunity, or an opportunity
lost. Moreover, this adm inistration
will be responsible for m anaging the
transfer of the Panam a Canal and
the military bases from the U nited

States to Panama. Most Panam an
ians recognize that their success or
failure in dealing with this will play
a determ inant role in shaping the
n atio n ’s econom ic and political
future.
T h e E l e c t o r a l T r ib u n a l

T he institution em powered by the
C onstitution to set up the electoral
process is the Electoral Tribunal.
The Tribunal is com posed of three
magistrates, one appointed by the
Executive, one by the Suprem e
Court, and a third by the National
Legislative Assembly. M embers
serve 10-year terms, and are charged
with regulating the activities of polit
ical parties and candidates. They set
up the tim etable for the registra
tion o f political parties, candidates,
and voters. The Tribunal was also
given authority over the Fuerza
Publica (the police force) six days
before the elections and up to the
official proclam ation of the
President-Elect.
The voting process was organized
around five ballots: one for presi
dent and vice president, one for the
legislature, one for mayor, one for
com m unity representative, and one
for councilm en (only a few districts
elect councilm en). The Electoral
Tribunal has the authority to
appoint all electoral corporations
for the purpose of counting the
votes. At the polling place, each
“m esa” is organized with three offi
cials. From each individual polling
place the ballots are then distrib
uted to the various C ounting
Boards. The National C ounting
Board counts the votes for president
and vice president. T he Legislative
District (“C ircuito”) C ounting Board
counts the votes for the legislature.
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Panama inches toward electoral democracy

T he District C ounting Board is
responsible for the votes for mayor,
and the Com munity Counting
Board does the same for Council
m en and Com munity representative.

alliances. T he 1994 elections were
no exception. Four such alliances
were form ed for the 1994 elections
(see inset).
T h e C a m p a ig n

P a r t ie s

and

A l l ia n c e s

Twenty-two political parties initial
ly requested legal recognition from
the Electoral Tribunal in order to
participate in the 1994 elections.
T he Electoral Code requires those
who want to register as political par
ties to present 18,500 signatures to
the Tribunal. By the beginning of
the electoral process in November
of 1993, the Tribunal had recog
nized 16 of them as political parties
(see inset). T he law requires each
party to receive at least five percent
of the valid votes for president, legis
lator, or com m unity representative
in o rd er to survive as a legal politi
cal entity.
O f these, only the Revolutionary
Democratic Party, the Liberal Party,
the A uthentic Liberal, the Christian
Democrats, the Liberal Republican
Nationalist Movement, and the
Nationalist Popular Party had previ
ously been involved in an electoral
process. T he Arnulfista Party had
participated before but u n d er a dif
ferent nam e and leadership.
Panam anian law allows political
parties to form alliances in o rd er to
contest national elections. In fact,
Panam anian electoral politics have
traditionally been structured around
such alliances. Seldom have these
electoral alliances, however, been
constructed on the basis of political
ideology or even program m atic
agreem ent. T he contestation o f the
election and the partition o f power
afterwards have been the raison
d ’etre o f Panam anian electoral

D uring the first few m onths after
the official opening of campaign
season (November 8, 1993), the
concern of m ost political parties was
to find a presidential candidate and
to build a viable electoral alliance.
According to the electoral code, par
ties had until February 8, 1994 to
nom inate candidates. It therefore
becam e vital for all alliances to be
settled by that date.
The official campaign began on
February 8, 1994. Both Change ‘94
and the Democratic Alliance (repre
senting candidates who had served
in the E ndara governm ent and had
vigorously opposed the Noriega
regime) attem pted to re-play the
1989 elections— that elections were
a choice between a retu rn to the
militarist past or the consolidation
of a dem ocratic system. Groups that
had been involved in the National
Civic C rusade m ade m uch of the
links between Perez Balladares and
the Noriega regim e and, until the
very last, attem pted to build a
“G rand Civilian Alliance” to defeat
the PRD (Revolutionary
Democratic Party). Those efforts
failed partly because o f the intransi
gence of the various actors involved
in those negotiations, and partly
because the “civilian vs. militarist”
dichotom y no longer mobilized the
electorate. T he voters were m ore
concerned with their im m ediate
problem s o f unem ploym ent and
poverty. Labels and attacks that had
succeeded in 1989 in the midst of
an econom ic crisis and a repressive

1994

P o l i t i c a l P a r tie s

Arnulfista
Authentic Liberal
Christian Democratic Party
Civilian Renewal
Doctrinaire Panam enista Party
Independent Democratic Union
Labor
Liberal
Liberal Republican
Liberal Republican
Nationalist Movement
National Mission o f Unity
Nationalist Popular Party
National Renovation Movement
Papa Egoro
Revolutionary Democratic Party
Solidarity
1994

E l e c t o r a l A llia n c e s

United People’s Alliance:
Revolutionary Democratic Party
Labor
Liberal Republican Party
Democratic Alliance:
Arnulfista
Liberal
Authentic Liberal
Independent Democratic Union
Change ‘94:
Liberal Republican
Nationalist Movement
Civilian Renewal
National Renovation Movement
National Concertation Alliance:
Solidarity
National Mission o f Unity
T he rem aining parties did not
participate in formal alliances.
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military regime, could no t work in
a context in which there was no
N ational Guard, no dictatorship, no
im m ediate national crisis, and no
clear preference from the US
regarding the candidates.
T he PRD obviously took advan
tage of this situation to present
themselves as a new dem ocratic
party, no longer tied to the military.
Its cam paign centered around the
im m ediate problem s o f the elec
torate, attem pting to present con
crete answers to the problem s of
unem ploym ent and poverty. While
somewhat superficial, it was the only
consistently positive campaign, and
the only one to speak in term s of
programs.
Both the C hange ‘94 and the
Democratic Alliance campaigns
alternated between negative attacks
on the PRD and superficial atten
tion to the n atio n ’s problems.
Toward the end, it was the Change
‘94 campaign, led by Ruben Carles,
that sponsored most of the attacks.
It also orchestrated a negative attack
on the Ruben Blades campaign
when it becam e clear that Blades
was moving ahead o f Carles in the
polls. T he campaign, aided by the
tabloid El Siglo, accused Blades of
being a closet com m unist, as well as
a closet supporter of the military
regime. In the end, the negative
cam paign may have had some
effect, scaring away some of Blades’s
potential support.
Two m ajor ph en o m ena ultimately
shaped the electoral process: First,
the fragm entation of the so-called
“civilian” forces and their inability to
make militarism a m ajor campaign
them e; second, the ability o f the
PRD to present themselves as a real
and legitimate alternative. The
organizational power o f the PRD
and the Arnulfista parties helped
make them the two most popular
parties, while a shortage of money
and organization h indered Blades’s
attem pt to present him self as the
“outsider. ”
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C o n c l u s io n

While the post-invasion govern
m ent has m ade significant progress
toward institutionalizing a dem ocra
tic regim e, many problem s remain.
T he 1994 elections may well be the
m ost im portant in the n atio n ’s his
tory. T hat they were free, honest
and peaceful, and not subject to sig
nificant degrees o f foreign influ
ence, represents a step forw ard in
the n atio n ’s evolution towards a
m ore dem ocratic state and society.
At the same time, the continuation

o f social fragm entation and high
levels of public cynicism cloud
prospects for the new governm ent.
In some ways, Panam a’s problem s
pale when com pared to those of
such nearby states as Nicaragua,
Guatemala, El Salvador, or even
Colombia. But, in an o th er sense,
historical patterns of behavior and
beliefs could deal away Panam a’s
best hopes for a prosperous and
peaceful future; this should be the
subject o f concern inside and out
side Panam a. ■

T a b l e 1: P r e s id e n t i a l E l e c t i o n R e s u l t s

Votes Percentage

Candidates
Ernesto Perez Balladares (United People's Alliance)
Mireya de G ruber (Democratic Alliance)
Ruben Blades (Papa Egoro)
Ruben Carles (Change ‘94)
Eduardo Vallarino (Christian Democrat)
Samuel L. Galindo (National Concertation Alliance)
Jose S. M unoz (Doctrinaire Panam anian Party)
TOTAL

355,307
310,372
182,405
171,192
25,476
18,424
3,668

33.3
29.1
17.1
16.1
2.4
1.7
0.3

1,066,844

100.0

Source: Electoral Tribunal

T a b l e 2: N

a t io n a l

Political Party

A sse m b l y R e su l t s

by

P o l it ic a l P a r t y

Seats

P R D .............................................................................................................................31
A rn u lfista................................................................................................................... 14
Papa Egoro .................................................................................................................6
MOLIRENA .............................................................................................................. 5
A uthentic Liberal ..................................................................................................... 4
Civilian R e n e w a l........................................................................................................3
L ib e ra l..........................................................................................................................3
S o lid a rity ..................................................................................................................... 2
Republican L ib e r a l....................................................................................................1
Labor P a r t y ................................................................................................................. 1
Christian D e m o c rat....................................................................................................1
MORENA ....................................................................................................................1
TOTAL ..................................................................................................................... 72
Source: Electoral Tribunal
Num bers may vary as legal challenges are resolved by the Electoral Tribunal.

DANCE, MYTH, AND RITUAL: THE AMERICAS
A n I n t e r n a t io n a l C o n f e r e n c e C e l eb r a t in g t h e 3 0 t h
A n n iv er sa r y o f t h e C o n g r ess o n R e se a r c h in D a n c e

November 2-5, 1995
H osted by
NWSA
New World School of the Arts

INDAMI
Intercultural Dance and Music Institute

M iami, Florida

Florida International University

The conference will bring together artists, educators, and
scholars who will address dance, myth, and ritualfrom
a variety o f perspectives, including anthropology,
sociology, history, literature, ethnomusicology, popular
culture, gender studies, aesthetics, and criticism.
Keynote Speakers Include:
Veve Clark, Associate Professor of African and Caribbean Literature,
University of California, Berkeley, author of The Legend of Maya Deren.
Allegra Fuller-Snyder, Professor Emeritus and Director, Graduate Program in Dance
Ethnology, UCLA, Director of “Bayaniha,” an award-winning documentary on Filipino dance.
JoAnn Kealiihonomoku, Executive Director of Cross-Cultural Dance Resources, dance anthropologist,

and author of numerous publications on Pacific, Native and African American dance cultures.
Rex Netdeford, Full Professor, University of the West Indies, Artistic Director of
National Dance Theatre Company of Jamaica, author of DanceJamaica, Roots and Rhythms.
Sally Price, Social Anthropologist, author of Primitive Art in Civilized Places, Caribbean Contours.
Edith Turner, Professor of Anthropology, University of Virginia, author of The Spirit and the Drum, Experiencing Ritual.

For more information, contact:
Dr. Andrea Mantell-Seidel, Director or Suzanne T. Duncan, Program Coordinator

Intercultural Dance and Music Institute • Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University, University Park, Miami, Florida 33199
(305) 348-2894/FAX (305) 348-3593
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Drugs and Kisses

Huizenga on the Move

While it all appeared to be hugs
and kisses at the Summit of the
Americas, the d ru g issue still divides
the U nited States and Latin
America. Weeks before the Summit,
the US tried to get A ndean delega
tions to sign a controversial 40 page
ad dendum (to the Plan of Action)
on anti-narcotics strategy. W hen
faced with the prospect of a hotly
contested Sum m it agenda,
W ashington pulled back and agreed
to the w atered down anti-narcotics
declaration released on D ecem ber
11. Bolivian sources claim that
W ashington wanted to condition
trade agreem ents in progress with
anti-narcotics initiatives.

Long before renting videos becam e
popular in the U nited States, Latin
Am ericans were spending their
weekends in front of VCRs. This
Latin Am erican preference will now
enjoy a m ore competitive atmos
phere. According to a rep o rt in the
Miami Herald (O ctober 11, 1994),
Blockbuster E ntertainm ent Group,
owned by Viacom, licensed Video
Chile S.A. to open 75 video outlets
in A rgentina in 1995. According to
Ram on M artin Busitill, the move
was prom pted by Blockbuster’s suc
cess in Chile and Venezuela and the
potential video m arket in Argentina.

Cuba Looks Down Under

Colombia is again attem pting to
decipher free m arket messages from
the U nited States. Pressure from
US flower distributors led the US
D epartm ent of C om m erce to levy a
22.7% tariff on cut flowers from
Colombia. Colom bian tuna was
recently excluded from the US m ar
ket because that country’s fisher
m en are no t doing enough to pre
vent the killing of dolphins. In
1992, similar restrictions were
im posed only to be lifted a year
later. According to the Colombian
C ham ber o f Fisheries, the US
should develop norm s that are not
based on “false ecological criteria
that only shelter US econom ic inter
ests.”

Sorry Charlie

O n O ctober 10, Spanish news ser
vices rep o rted th at Australia’s
W estern M ining C orporation will
invest approxim ately US$500 million
in a jo in t enterprise with C uba’s
Com m ercial Caribbean Nickel S.A.
to prospect, explore, and exploit
nickel deposits in C uba’s O riente
province. The Australian firm will
have a 65% share in the project ver
sus C uba’s 35%. T he jo in t enter
prise expects to explore and exploit
the Pinares del Mayari region,
where it is estim ated that 37% of
the w orld’s nickel reserves are locat
ed. This is the second such deal
signed by the Cubans; in Ju n e the
C om pam a G eneral de Niquel S.A.
and the S herritt Incorporated
signed a similar agreem ent.

War of the Pacific, Part II

Edited by Eduardo A. Gamarra

Bolivians and Chileans appear to be
re-fighting the War o f the Pacific via
the inform ation superhighway.
T hroughout October, newsgroup
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users on the In tern et engaged in a
nationalistic free for all over the
scheduled perform ance o f two
Chilean musical groups (“Bafochi”
and “Inti Illim ani”) at Lisner
A uditorium in W ashington, DC.
According to Bolivian In tern et
users, Bafochi was playing Bolivian
folklore ranging from Aymara to
Guarani Indian music w ithout rec
ognizing its origin. O n the
Internet, Chilean nationals claim ed
that the music and dances—diablada, llam erada, taquirari, cullawada,
am ong others—were from N o rth ern
Chile. T hreatened with the
prospect o f a picket line of Bolivian
residents at their residence in the
DC area, Bafochi withdrew those
pieces from their perform ance. Inti
Illimani, on the o th er hand, recog
nized the Bolivian origin o f the
music they perform ed and noted
that one of its founding m em bers is
a Bolivian.

Highway Robbery?
The New York Times Business Day
(November 12, 1994) reports that
private contractors are building
highways across South America at
an unpreced en ted rate and scale.
With funding from m ultilateral
agencies continually falling, govern
m ents are turning to the private sec
tor to build transportation infra
structure. In return, the contrac
tors retain the right to levy tolls.
M exico’s new 3,000 mile toll road
system is a prim e exam ple o f such
projects. At the en d of 1994, the
Brazilian governm ent began en ter
taining bids for a 265 mile highway
to ru n between Rio and Sao
Paulo—an estim ated $ 1 billion
investment. O n Novem ber 20, the

F

Times published a response from
one individual who was less than
enthusiastic about private com pa
nies profiting from national infra
structure projects. T he irate reader
labeled it simple “highway robbery.”

Mercosur v. NAFTA
Tim ed to coincide with the
D ecem ber 1994 Sum m it o f the
Americas, A rthur A ndersen & Co.
released an im portant survey of
future hem ispheric business trends.
Am ong the findings: most business
executives in Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, and Venezuela still think
the US is their m ost im portant m ar
ket, but expect this to change short
ly. A significant portion of those
interviewed predicted that trade
am ong South Am erican countries
would soon be m ore im portant than
trade between their countries and
m em bers o f NAFTA. Starting
Jan u ary 1, 1995, 90% of trade
between the four M ercosur coun
tries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay,
and U ruguay)—which account for
two-thirds of South A m erica’s eco
nom ic activity—becam e duty-free.

Un Whopper o Dos?
B urger King, owned by the British
com pany G rand Met, has unveiled
franchising as its principal strategy
for taking on the Latin Am erican
m arket. At present, the H om e of
the W hopper runs about 12 restau
rants in m etropolitan Mexico City.
T he rest of the region is served
through a network of in d ependent
franchises. Business Latin America
(Septem ber 5, 1994) reports the
standardization of franchising pro
cedures, including the granting of

I

L

exclusive rights, territorial reserva
tions, standard royalties and fees,
and reserving the right to approve
all new contracts on an individual
basis. B urger King’s entry into
Latin America was the focus o f a
case study in the m onthly publica
tion Finance Director Latin America.
Copies may be obtained by calling
1-800-938-4685.

City of Knowledge
The Panam anian governm ent of
Ernesto Perez Balladares wants to
put together an am bitious plan to
exploit the Panam a Canal and its
500-square mile corridor when they
revert to Panam anian control in
1999. Foreign M inister Gabriel
Lewis is reportedly heading a cam
paign prom oting a Panam anian
“City of Knowledge” which would
entail converting the bases into uni
versities and training centers. Such
an institution would be m odelled
on the Am erican University in Cairo
and Beirut, which is accredited by
professional associations in the US.
T he project requires $50 million in
seed m oney and tens o f millions in
m aintenance thereafter.

Law and Order
T he O ctober 1994 commando-style
slaying o f Paraguayan anti-drug
chief Ram on Rosa Rodriguez is far
from resolved. After denying his
guilt before the investigating magis
trate, the m ain suspect, Captain
Ju an Emiliano Ruiz Diaz, went on to
say that Paraguay was hom e to three
“m ini-cartels” headed by prom inent
politicians and officers o f the arm ed
forces. O ne of the accused,
Admiral E duardo Gonzalez Petit,

E

prom ised to sue Ruiz Diaz for slan
der. The allegations sparked a
national debate over the extent of
drug trafficking and its influence in
the country.

Pizza with Champagne
In Buenos Aires, a sociologist’s
account of Carlos M enem ’s spend
ing habits sold 10,000 copies in two
days. According to Silvina W agner’s
Pizza with Champagne, the lowestincom e groups in A rgentina
(arguably the segm ent m ost affected
by the governm ent’s austerity poli
cies) still dem onstrate strong elec
toral support for President M enem
thanks to his successful bid to end
hyper-inflation. T he au th o r alleges
that a facade o f m acroeconom ic
stability obscured growing u nem 
ploym ent, the deterioration o f the
educational system, worsening
incom e distribution, and a spectacu
lar increase in consumerism.
W agner claims that h er objective in
writing the book was to profile the
am orality and im punity of the politi
cians in late twentieth-century
A rgentina.

Pele Shuffle
F ernando H enrique C ardoso’s pres
idential appointm ents are getting a
lot o f ink. T he appo in tm en t o f for
m er president Itam ar Franco as
am bassador to Portugal was over
shadowed by the nam ing of soccer
superstar Pele (whose real nam e is
Edson Arantes do Nascim ento) to
head the newly created Ministry of
Sports. Pele’s precedent-setting
achievem ents are not lim ited to ath
letics: he will be the only black m an
in C ardoso’s cabinet. ■
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Electing Ernesto
Jennifer L. McCoy

(National Action Party, PAN),
hen given the
argued? Could it have been the
chance for
result of massive fraud, as charged by
change, Mex
the third-place candidate, Cuauh
icans opted for
temoc Cardenas of the Partido de la
the status quo.
Revolution Democratica (Revolutionary
After questions
Democratic Party, PRD) ?
over the authenticity of Carlos
The same num bers have been used
Salinas’s 1988 presidential victory,
to support different interpretations
the ruling Partido Revolutionario
of the outcome: those who wish to
Institutional (Institutional Revolu
emphasize a m andate for change use
tionary Party, PRI) and opposition
the percentage of total votes cast (a
political parties negotiated a series of
minority of 48.77 percent for the win
reforms to open up the electoral
ner, Ernesto Zedillo of the PRI),
process. Mexican authorities then
while those who wish to emphasize
accredited 88,000 nationals and near
that the PRI still commands a majori
ly 1,000 foreigners to observe the
ty of public support use the percent
August 21, 1994 elections. With new
age of valid votes cast (50.18 percent
rules and new electoral authorities,
for Zedillo), which excludes blank,
the groundwork was laid for the
mismarked, and write-in votes.
freest election in Mexican history.
The vote for the three major par
Conventional wisdom and pollsters’
ties indicates that the country is
predictions indicated that the higher
almost evenly split between a desire
the voter turn-out, the better the
for continuity and a yearning for
opposition would fare. Instead, with
change in the ruling party: 44 per
voters going to the polls in recordcent of the voters chose the main
breaking numbers, the incum bent
opposition parties, while 48 percent
PRI won both the presidency (with a
chose the incum bent. O n the other
twenty-point margin over the runnerhand, 75 percent chose the two con
up) , and large majorities in both
servative parties proposing almost
houses of Mexico’s Congress.
identical economic programs—the
W hat did the August 21 vote mean?
PRI and PAN—over the leftist PRD,
Was it, as the winning party claimed,
raising questions about the future for
an expression of confidence in the
a democratic left in Mexico.
governm ent’s perform ance and its
The popular congressional ballot
promise of a newly democratic sys
ing m irrored the presidential vote,
tem? O r was it the product of unfair
indicating that, contrary to some
campaign conditions, as the second
expectations, voters did not split their
place candidate, Diego Fernandez de
vote in the presidential and legislative
Cevallos of the Partido Action National
elections. However, because of the
formulas for electing representatives,
the PRI obtained substantial majori
Jennifer McCoy is associate professor of
ties in both houses: 75 percent of the
political science at Georgia State
Senate and 60 percent of the
University and senior research associate
Cham ber of Deputies (the maximum
at the Carter Center of Emory University.
allowed by the new election rules).
She was an observer to the August 21
Although they are still in the minori
Mexican elections.
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ty, opposition parties now have more
congressional representation than at
any time in the past other than the
1988-91 session of the Cham ber of
Deputies, when the PRI had only 52
percent representation.
The size of the PRI victory sur
prised many analysts, even though
several public opinion polls prior to
the elections predicted very similar
margins. Some pollsters had predict
ed an outcom e similar to Nicaragua’s
in 1990, where contrary to most polls,
large blocs of undeclared voters gave
the victory to the opposition coalition
over the ruling Sandinistas. Instead,
Mexico seemed to follow Bulgaria’s
example, where, in their first com pet
itive elections after the Communist
collapse, voters kept the (renam ed)
Communist party in power, apparent
ly out of fear of the unknown.
E x p l a in in g

the

V ote

The debate over the m eaning of
the vote will likely continue to rage in
Mexico for some time, and cannot be
definitively answered without indepth public opinion analysis, an
exhaustive study of electoral com
plaints, and imprecise socio-psychological analysis. We can offer some
prelim inary interpretations, however,
and assess the claims made by the
three major presidential candidates.
P e r fo r m a n c e

Governm ent perform ance during
Salinas’s sexenio (the six-year term of
the Mexican executive) very likely
recovered the middle class vote be
cause it m anaged a massive reduction
in inflation (from 157 percent in
1988 to less than 7 percent in 1993),
despite a stagnant economy in the
last two years of the administration.
Moreover, although the poor

u
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Mexico opts for the status quo

rem ained poor, the Solidarity pro
gram targeted potential voters in
poverty-stricken areas, bringing visi
ble improvements in infrastructure
and transportation.
On the other hand, the PAN may
have suffered from negative reactions
to its own perform ance in govern
ment. In each of the three states
with a PAN governor (Baja California
Norte, C hihuahua and Guanajuato),
the PRI swept both the congressional
and presidential races. Alternatively,
PAN may have suffered in those states
because of voter tendency not to split
the vote between congressional and
presidential races. This behavior may
have h urt PAN congressional candi
dates with those voters who preferred
the PRI at the executive level but who
would have supported PAN in the
Congress.

were injected into stories on Televisa,
the PRI candidate was disproportion
ately praised at a rate of twelve to one
over his competitors. Fairness in
news coverage improved in July, and
then deteriorated again in August.
Access to paid television time for
opposition parties was severely limit
ed by its high cost and by network
resistance to offering prime-time slots
to opposition candidates.
Attempts to regulate campaign rev
enues and spending were similarly
constrained. New policies set cam
paign spending limits at US$42 mil
lion per party for presidential cam
paigns and up to US$9 million for
Senate races. Only the PRI had the
resources to spend anywhere near
these generous limits. New limits on
individual contributions and require
ments to make party finances public
were difficult to enforce.

C a m pa ig n C o n d it io n s

A lukewarm com m itm ent to elec
toral reform by the Salinas govern
m ent eventually brought about signif
icant changes in election rules and
personnel in 1990, 1993, and 1994.
However, some of the changes came
very late in the game, especially the
change in the governing board of the
Instituto Federal Electoral (Federal
Elections Institute, IFE), limiting
their impact on the 1994 elections.
Attempts to redress very unequal
campaign conditions were hardly
effective. Studies of m edia coverage
during the campaign showed that the
two television agencies, Televisa and
TV Azteca, exhibited considerable
bias in their news reporting. In June,
the PRI candidate received three
times as much coverage as the PRD
candidate and 4.5 times m ore cover
age than the PAN candidate. W hen
value judgm ents about candidates

Fraud?

The most promising electoral re
forms were the new voter registration
lists and the tam per-proof voter ID
card, new election-day procedures to
minimize fraud, increased political
autonom y of the Electoral Institute’s
governing board, provisions for Mex
ican and foreign observers, and a new
criminal code with a special prosecu
tor to investigate complaints. Did
they prevent fraud on election day?
Skepticism about the PRI’s willing
ness to perm it a clean election was
widespread before the elections. A
variety of polls conducted in June
1994 showed that 35-45 percent of
the electorate expected fraud, while
between 25 and 50 percent thought
there would be clean elections
(Market O pinion and Research
International/M O RI; La Reforma-, and
the main electoral watchdog, Alianza

Civica (Civic Alliance)). Even m ore
alarming, 65 percent expected vio
lence in the event of electoral fraud
(Alianza). Yet, the day after the elec
tions, when early results showed a
com m anding 20 percent lead for the
PRI, the streets were quiet, with nei
ther jubilant victory celebrations nor
massive protest.
New safeguards and 89,000 ob
servers contributed to the peace.
Perhaps most im portant, parallel vote
tabulations, or “quick counts” done
by several independent groups con
firm ed the official results, which oth
erwise might have been disbelieved.
Alianza Civica, a Mexican NGO field
ing 11,000 observers and known to
include many critics of the PRI, was
the last to release its quick count, but
the most im portant in lending credi
bility to the official results.
Considering the lack of public con
fidence in the governm ent’s commit
m ent to transparent elections, and
the thousands of accredited observ
ers representing many different orga
nizations and perspectives, it is not
surprising that a m ultitude of views
regarding electoral conduct surfaced
after the fact. In addition, many
observer groups concentrated their
efforts in limited geographic areas,
giving rise to different pictures
depending on the locale.
The Zapatista insurgents charged
that eight million PRI votes—onequarter of those cast for the ruling
party—were fraudulent (La Jornada,
Septem ber 4, 1994). O n the other
hand, the US ambassador com m ent
ed that the elections represented “a
major advance for democracy in
Mexico” (New York Times, August 25,
1994). My delegation, organized by
the National Democratic Institute,
International Republican Institute,
Hemisphere • Volume Six, Number Three
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and The Carter C enter of Emory
University, concluded that electionday irregularities were not sufficiently
serious or widespread to have affect
ed the outcome of the presidential
race, but that further reforms were
needed to raise credibility and
address grossly unequal campaign
conditions.
The opposition parties held sharply
differing evaluations of the electoral
process and its outcome. The PRD
National Council concluded that “the
official results cannot be trusted, nor
are they the result of free and im par
tial elections. Therefore, these
results are illegal, and we do not
know who won or who lost” (La
Jornada, Septem ber 13, 1994). On
the other hand, the PAN National
Council accepted the results, arguing
that, despite the inequities, the offi
cial results “are the expression of the
electorate” (ElFinantiero, September
6, 1994).
The Mexican population’s cynicism
and lack of trust in the process was
not entirely assuaged by the out
come, but greater faith in electoral
authorities seems to have been
achieved. A poll published in La
Reforma and El Norte newspapers in
the last week of August showed that
61 percent thought the elections
were clean, while 24 percent did not
(15% claimed not to know). Like
wise, 64 percent thought the IFE
perform ed very well ( The Neivs,
Septem ber 3, 1994).
Nevertheless, a num ber of irregu
larities were observed that may have
had an effect on congressional or
local races, and that continue to raise
questions about the legitimacy of the
outcome. Alianza conducted an
exemplary, systematic analysis of the
election-day process. In its
Septem ber 19 report, the Alianza
argued that the irregularities com
prised a “fraud of com ponents” made
up of a num ber of discrete practices,
no single one of which would have
been sufficient to affect the outcome,
but the com bined impact of which
22 Hemisphere
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could have altered congressional and
local results. The two most serious
irregularities found in their statistical
sample of 1,810 voting stations were
pressure by party representatives to
influence voters, and violation of the
secrecy of the vote. Alianza noted
that these problems were m uch more
widespread in the rural and southern
areas of the country.
O ne of the most controversial
aspects of the election was the accura
cy of the voter registration lists.
Alianza initially reported that in 70
percent of the stations, some voters
with valid identification cards were
turned away because their names did
not appear on the lists. This raised
suspicions that opposition sympathiz
ers were deliberately “shaved” from
the lists. The subsequent Alianza
report, however, found that the num 
ber of voters potentially affected by
this problem was not large—an aver
age of four voters per station, com
prising less than one percent of the
registered voters.
Over 1,800 electoral complaints
were submitted by the political par
ties to the Electoral Tribunal. The
PRD filed the most, but PAN cited
irregularities in almost 15 percent of
the polling stations, and questioned
the outcom e of five congressional
races and some local races. In addi
tion, the election of the governor of
Chiapas (one of a few state-wide con
tests coinciding with the national
elections) was contested by the PRD.
Subsequently, election authorities
overturned two congressional seats
initially won by the PRI, called for
new elections in two additional con
gressional races, and overturned the
PRI victory in the M onterrey mayoral
race.
V ote

of

F ear

A fourth interpretation of the elec
toral outcom e is a socio-psychological
one: that it was a vote cast out of fear
of changing ships in a year of trauma.
The Chiapas rebellion, the assassina
tion of Luis Donaldo Colosio, and

economic uncertainty in the wake of
NAFTA and a recession all fed into
the PRI’s campaign message that it
was the only party capable of steering
the country into the future. Was a
“vote of fear” the result of biased
media campaigns that distorted per
ceptions about opposition candi
dates, or was it a product of an
ingrained conservative political cul
ture? Carlos Fuentes writes that
“Mexico voted for its m other and
father (the PRI) ” in a “parthenogenetic need for parental protec
tion." The divided vote also reflected
the country’s division between “its
conservative, dynastic, patriarchal
drive and its dwindling patience, its
m ustang instinct, and its political
ideals” (LaJornada, August 27, 1994).
Assessing the “fear of change fac
tor” with any precision is practically
impossible. It is particularly difficult
to distinguish between the negative
aspects of the electoral process,
which can be changed in the future,
and factors outside the control of the
parties or government—the contex
tual factors of the campaign or cul
tural factors. Nevertheless, post-elec
tion public opinion surveys should
allow an initial assessment of how
these factors affected the Mexican
vote.
O p p o s it i o n S t r a t e g ic E r r o r s

A fifth explanation of the vote is
the campaign strategy followed by the
opposition parties. A divided opposi
tion rarely defeats a long-term or
hegemonic party, unless that party
itself fragments or decays from with
in. For instance, the Union National
Opositora (National Opposition
Union) coalition in Nicaragua defeat
ed the Sandinistas only after uniting
fourteen political parties from the
left to the right on the political spec
trum. The Chilean Convergencia
(Convergence) united the left and
the center against a divided right to
defeat Pinochet’s allies in 1989. In
contrast, Panam a’s Revolutionary
Democratic Party (PRD) won in May
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1994 with only 33 percent of the vote
against a field of six candidates; and
in Paraguay, the incum bent Colorado
party defeated a divided opposition
with 40 percent of the vote in 1993.
The Mexican opposition utilized
campaign strategies that at times
seemed designed to lose rather than
gain votes. PAN candidate Diego
Fernandez seemed to drop out of
sight for a time after a spectacular
rise in the polls following the May 12
televised debate. Cardenas eschewed
media appearances in favor of rallies,
thus limiting his potential audience.
The PRD also had difficulty modify
ing its image as a confrontational and
even violent party because it persis
tently predicted fraud without pro
ducing very convincing evidence, and
because Cardenas m et with Zapatista
com m ander Marcos.
M o v e T ow ard D em o c r a c y ?

The 1994 elections were a step
toward a future of free, competitive
elections—one elem ent of a dem oc
ratic system. The high voter turn-out
indicated a desire to participate in

T h e 1 9 9 4 N a t io n a l E l e c t io n s

in

electoral politics, and perhaps re
flected a renewed confidence in elec
toral institutions. The m aturing of
civil society is another positive result
of this electoral process. The Mex
ican civic groups that organized to
prom ote democratic reforms and
observe the elections are unlikely to
disappear.
But after 65 years of a single ruling
party and the symbiotic relationship
this situation has forged between
party and state, change is not easy
and m uch remains to be done. The
new governm ent has an opportunity
to prom ote democratic change and
enhance its own legitimacy. To do so,
it will have to avoid the tem ptation of
triumphalism—a return to old prac
tices of unilateral rule—and instead
reach out to the opposition and
embrace m ore political reform. If
President Zedillo fulfills his promises
of ending the dedazo (the selection of
the next president by the incum bent
o n e), opening up internal party elec
tions, and listening to the opposition
while furthering political reform,
progress will be m ore likely.

M ex ic o

President
(% of votes cast)
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)
Partido Action National (PAN)
Partido de la Revolution Democratica (PRD)
Partido del Trabajo (PT)
Partido Verde Ecologista de Mexico (PVEM)
Partido del Frente Cardenista de Reconstruction National (PFCRN)
Partido Autentico de la Revolution Mexicana (FARM)
Partido Popular Socialista (PPS)
Partido Democrata Mexicano (PDM)
Null votes
Other
TOTAL

O n the other hand, the weakening
of the PRD means that a trilateral
party system representing a range of
ideological interests is not secure in
Mexico. The danger is that the
defeat of the left may engender m ore
violent responses. The challenge is
to revitalize a democratic left that can
push for social reforms and provide a
peaceful, political voice for the disad
vantaged.
A democratic political culture is
the most difficult elem ent of dem oc
racy to achieve, and often the last.
The tangible elements of political
rules and institutions are the simplest
to establish; but until the rules are
respected, the institutions are trusted,
and the electoral outcomes are
accepted by all segments of the soci
ety, a democratic political culture will
be elusive and democracy will be in
complete. In the end, the August 21
elections may have been the most
scrutinized and cleanest vote in
Mexico’s history. But, outside of
Cuba and the Dominican Republic,
they were still the most distrusted
and unfair in the hem isphere. ■

48.77
25.94
16.60
2.74
0.93
0.85
0.55
0.47
0.28
2.82
0.05
100.00%

Senate
(# of seats)

Chamber of Deputies
(# of seats)

95
25
8

300
119
71
10

-

-

-

-

-

—

-

-

-

-

_

_

-

-

128

500

Source: Institute Federal Electoral
NOTE: The Chamber of Deputies has 300 seats representing single-member districts, and 200 seats by proportional representation.
A single party can receive no more than 300 total seats in the Chamber unless it wins 60% of the vote, which raises the maximum
seats to 315.
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Juan’s Light
Kathleen Logan

treet vendor Juan de Dios
Hoil lives with his wife and
two daughters in a work
ing class neighborhood of
M erida, the historic capital
city of Yucatan state in
southern Mexico. J u a n ’s actions
during recent elections exemplify a
m ajor tren d in Mexican politics—
the deep grassroots support for
dem ocratic reform .
After voting in the November
1993 Yucatan state elections, Juan
re tu rn ed to the polling place with
his taco cart to sell food to the
crowd gathered outside. At five in
the afternoon the voting en ded and
the vote count began. At 6:15 P.M.
the electricity suddenly went off—
n o t only at the poll bu t all over
Yucatan. T he crowd outside the
polling station immediately began
shouting and whistling. No one
believed th at the power outage was
accidental. Most attributed it to an
effort by the PRI (Partido
Revolutionary Institutional) to sabo
tage the election in order to contin
ue its 65-year rule.
After a few m inutes of darkness, a
spot of light appeared, moving
through the crowd. Ju an de Dios
H oil was bringing the kerosene
lam p from his cart to the vote coun
ters inside the poll. As he gave
them his lamp, Ju an becam e an
instant hero to his cheering neigh
bors. With J u a n ’s light, the vote
count continued.

S

Kathleen Logan is an associate professor
of anthropology at Florida International
University. Her current research projects
include studies of women’s participation
in the democratic transformation of
Mexico.
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Ju an de Dios Hoil defended his
n atio n ’s dem ocratic reform in a sim
ple, spontaneous act. In the presi
dential elections of August 21, 1994
millions of o th er Mexicans also
defended dem ocratic reform by vot
ing in a record setting tu rn o u t—
nearly 80% o f M exico’s voters went
to the polls. T heir high tu rn o u t was
perhaps the single most im portant
feature of the 1994 political year
because it dem onstrated the citizen
ry’s com m itm ent to political reform .

In the presidential elections
of August 21, 1994, millions
of Mexicans defended
democratic reform by voting
in a record setting turnout.

For m ost Mexicans reform ing
dem ocracy m eans holding honest
elections, establishing a multi-party
system, and ending the PRI’s dom i
nance o f their governm ent. For
others, dem ocratic reform also in
cludes econom ic issues and indige
nous rights.
Since the first hint of a dem ocrat
ic opening in the 1960s, Mexicans
have mobilized politically with a
depth and sophistication greater
than at any time in their history.
Some of their organization has
taken place within the structure of
political parties; some in grassroots
organizations. In either case,
Mexicans are now positioned to act
politically as never before.
Millions o f Mexicans have jo in ed
the eight political parties that have

em erged from the PRI’s retreating
shadow. Several of these opposition
parties have becom e true political
forces contesting the PRI’s hegem o
ny particularly at the regional level.
T he right-of-center PAN (Partido de
Action National) is strong in Yucatan
and some western and n o rth ern
states while the left-of-center PRD
(Partido de la Revolution Democratica)
draws its support from the Mexico
City m etropolis and various central
and southern states. T he PT (Partido
de Trabajo), as M exico’s fourth party,
shows strength in areas that overlap
with both PAN and PRD strong
holds.
In addition to citizen m obilization
within m ajor opposition political
parties, Mexicans have also form ed
smaller, single issue parties such as
the ecology (Partido Verde Ecologista)
party. While such parties represent
only a small m inority of voters, they
do serve to keep com pelling issues
in front o f the public eye and
engage a small sector o f dedicated
activists in the political process.
While the activities o f opposition
parties are widely rep o rted in the
m edia, less well known b u t equally
influential are the asociationes civiles
(civil associations). Since the late
1960s, Mexicans have organized at
the grassroots by form ing citizen
watchdog groups, hum an rights
organizations, campesino collectives,
urban neighborhood associations,
and ecology, w om en’s and indige
nous p eo p le’s groups. These civil
associations have sought political
reform and redress of their particu
lar grievances. A lthough many such
groups are organized locally or
regionally, some are linked together
nationally and are becom ing politi
cally skilled on the national scene.
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Mexican politics into the 21st century

T he Frente Civico Familiar, a right of
center coalition with a pro-business,
pro-dem ocracy and conservative
social values agenda, is one such
organization.
At times, the PRI-dom inated
state’s m ishandling of catastrophic
events has spurred grassroots orga
nizing. T he state’s violent suppres
sion o f the 1968 student m ovem ent
and its inadequate response to the
devastation o f the 1985 Mexico City
earthquake provoked a serious
exam ination of the PRI’s rule by
many Mexicans. Citizens, especially
in the Mexico City metropolis,
responded by form ing grassroots
organizations to bring political
change. M ore recently, the rebel
lion by the Chiapas Maya in January
1994 has led many Mexicans to pon
der their governm ent’s handling of
indigenous affairs.
W ithin both political parties and
civil associations, space has opened
for new political actors, most
notably women. Some observers
think that the em ergence o f women
in Mexican politics can be partly
explained by culturally perceived
ideas of gender. Women politicians
are often th o u g h t to be m ore
responsible, honest, and service ori
en ted than m en. They are seen as
m ore likely to represent the peo
p le’s interest to the state rather than
the state’s interest to the people.
Am ong the m ost notable women
leaders who have becom e im portant
political figures are Cecilia Soto of
the PT, Ana Rosa Payan Cervera of
the PAN, and Rosario Ibarra de
Piedra, a hum an rights activist.
T h ro u g h o u t the political cam
paigns o f the 1980s and 1990s,
opposition political parties and citi
zen ’s grassroots organizations have

galvanized the Mexican populace to
push for dem ocratic reform . Since
the PRI, however, still controls the
pace and direction of reform , politi
cal parties and citizen groups will
n eed to continue their efforts if
Mexico is to transform its political
system.

The PRI is not now, nor
ever has been, a monolith.
Today, the fissures within
the PRI are deeper than at
any time since its founding.

T he

d in o s a u r s

Equally im portant to citizen m obi
lization as a transform ative force in
Mexican politics is the PRI itself. In
August, Mexican voters elected the
PRI candidate—Dr. Ernesto Zedillo
Ponce de Leon—as president by a
narrow m argin. While the vote
count represented a victory for the
PRI, it was no t a m andate.
T he PRI’s critics call the party’s
leaders los dinosaurios in reference
to the party’s 65-year rule and the
advanced age of some of its leaders.
Critics often voice their opposition
to the PRI as if it were a single,
cohesive entity.
But the PRI is no t now, n o r ever
has been, a m onolith. T he PRI is a
political party long divided by ideo
logical currents, regional differ
ences, and contesting leaders.
Today, however, the fissures within
the PRI are deeper than at any time
since its founding.
At issue within the PRI, as within
the nation, is the party’s control of

the path and pace of dem ocratic
reform . A lthough ideology, region,
and leadership differences continue
to be forces that divide the PRI, a
m ore basic fissure has developed
between those who favor reform
and those who resist it.
Many who resist reform efforts do
so to protect their perceived selfinterest. T he PRI has controlled
the Mexican state and consequently
all its resources for m ore than six
decades, successfully em ploying a
patron-client m odel to g arn er sup
port. As a result, many o f those affil
iated with the PRI receive state sub
sidies o r are state employees. PRI
supporters fear losing their benefits
or jobs if an opposition party were
to win control o f the state.
O th er PRI m em bers resist reform
ou t of party loyalty. They believe
that the PRI has done m uch good
for Mexico, can continue to do so,
and should rem ain in office. PRI
loyalists point out that their party is
the only one with governing experi
ence and question the ability of any
opposition party to govern Mexico.
Those within the PRI who resist
change also predict that violence
will accom pany political changes
that displace the PRI. T he underly
ing them e of these argum ents is
that what is good for the PRI is also
good for Mexico.
O th er factions within the PRI seek
reform . Such reform ers regard
political change as inevitable and
probably beneficial for Mexico in
the long run. They have the diffi
cult task o f fighting for reform with
those that resist it while sim ultane
ously presenting a united PRI front
to the public.
PRI reform ers have sought to con
trol the process o f political change
Hemisphere • Volume Six, Number Three
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through particular strategies. They
have been gradually willing to con
cede especially contested areas to
their political opposition (such as
local and state elections in the PAN
and PRD strongholds). PRI reform 
ers have also op en ed less powerful
sectors of the state to the opposition
(the federal legislature). And they
have sought to make elections m ore
honest or at least sought less obvi
ous ways to m anipulate the electoral
process.
PRI infighting will continue
through the six-year presidency of
Dr. Zedillo. T he m ost om inous sign
o f this internal party debate, howev
er, is its violent expression. In
March 1994 the original PRI presi
dential candidate, Luis Donaldo
Colosio, was assassinated. Since
then the second highest ranking
PRI official after the president,
Secretary G eneral Jose Francisco
Ruiz Massieu, has also been assassi
nated. Rumors o f threats on the
lives o f o th er reform ers including
President Zedillo continue to circu
late. Many Mexicans think that the
assassinations were underw ritten by
PRI factions that strongly oppose
change. O thers claim that the narcotraficantes have also been involved,
using the chaos of violence to go
after their enemies. Regardless of
the origins of this violence, however,
it is the m ost destructive force in
the struggle for dem ocracy in
Mexico.

m ost obvious at the local and
regional level. More and m ore
m unicipal and state governm ents
consist of elected officials from two
political parties. Officials o f these
town councils and state congresses
can rarely afford the luxury o f ideo
logical debate. Instead they must
confront specific tasks: getting
streets paved, schools built, and
local disputes resolved. T he success
of these multi-party governing bod
ies will depend on how well they can
accom m odate political plurality.
Since many resources com e from
the PRI controlled central govern
m ent, a test of the PRI’s com m it
m ent to political plurality will be its
willingness to give state support to
opposition or multi-party local and
regional governments.
Equally significant o f the PRI’s
support o f dem ocratic reform will
be its willingness to separate itself
from the state bureaucracy. T here
is a need in Mexico to depoliticize
public service offices—getting a dri
ver’s license or a pothole filled need
not be partisan political acts. Since
so many public service offices are
appointed, these officials owe their
em ploym ent to the PRI. T he offi
cials’ first loyalty is likely to be to
the PRI and not to the public they
purportedly serve. A few appointed
offices have been rem oved from the
political arena by allowing the same
bureaucrats to continue in office
from one change in party adm inis

tration to the next. Nonetheless,
the PRI and the state are still too
tightly intertwined.
A m ore difficult issue for the PRI
to face than political reform of its
bureaucracy is the problem of the
south. M exico’s future is being
forecast in its southern states— the
n atio n ’s poorest and least politically
and economically integrated region.
Subject to decades o f neglect, the
rebellion by the Chiapas Maya has
dramatically brought the region to
the center o f the n atio n ’s attention.
Many Mexicans recognize the
legitimacy o f Mayan dem ands for
econom ic and social justice while at
the same time decrying violence as
a solution to the reg io n ’s problem s.
Because of the Chiapas rebellion,
Mexico m ust confront its indige
nous present in addition to its
indigenous past. T he m an n er in
which the Zedillo adm inistration
handles the Chiapas issue will have
long range consequences n o t only
for the indigenous peoples of
Mexico but also for the southern
tier of the country in which many of
them live. Mexico cannot continue
to p retend that all of Mexico is like
the n o rth and center.
With massive citizen m obilization
generating a force for political
change from the bottom up and
internal debate within the PRI creat
ing a force from the inside out,
Mexico pushes its dem ocratization
into the 21st century. ■

M e x ic o ’s P o l it ic a l F u t u r e

Citizen mobilization, internal
debate within the PRI and the polit
ical dynamic between these two
forces propel Mexico toward dem o
cratic reform . W ithin this context of
political change, the em ergence o f a
multi-party dem ocracy at the local
level; the separation o f the state
bureaucracy from the PRI, and the
integration of the Mexican south
are issues likely to be im portant.
T he signs of a multi-party dem oc
racy em erging in Mexico are
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Guns and Roses
Jack Child

he profound changes
flict and create space for diplomacy.
in Latin Am erica’s
While the renewed interest in the
domestic and interna
peacekeeping role has implications
tional affairs in the
for the military’s mission—bearing
last decade have
on its professionalism, deployment,
inevitably affected the
and relationship to the civilian polit
military establishments and security
ical authority—it is not a new role
arrangem ents of the area. Although
for the Latin American military.
the stated basic mission of Latin
Modest num bers o f Latin American
Am erica’s militaries—defense of sov
military observers have form ed part
ereignty— (and the unstated one of
of many U nited Nations (UN)
self-preservation and protection of
peacekeeping and peace-observing
privileges) has n o t changed funda
missions from their first deploy
mentally, the end of the Cold War
m ents in the late 1940s. O n a few
has seriously u n d erm ined the old
occasions, nations such as Brazil,
roles related to counterinsurgency,
Colombia, Peru and Panam a (and
hem ispheric defense, and geopolitilater Argentina, Venezuela and
cally-based national security doc
Uruguay) have provided 500-700
trines.
m an battalions in support of UN
In response to the changing
peacekeeping efforts.
world situation, new military roles
have been suggested for Latin
Am erica’s military forces, and in
The peacekeeping
many cases assumed. Am ong the
missions gaining in im portance are
role is not a new
those linked to the em erging con
one for the Latin
cept o f “cooperative security” which
stresses preventative actions to avoid
American military.
conflicts, and multilateral responses
On a few occasions
to those conflicts that do break out.
several Latin American
Cooperative security gives the mili
tary responsibility for confidencenations have provided
building measures (CBMs) designed
500-700 man battalions
to make conflict less likely. A nother
strong contender as a leading role
in support of UN
—international peacekeeping—
peacekeeping efforts.
attem pts to limit outbreaks of con-

T

Jach Child (lieutenant colonel, US Army,
retired) is professor of Spanish and Latin
American studies at The American
University. He is the author of The
Central American Peace Process,
1983-1991: Sheathing Swords,
Building Confidence. (Lynne Rienner,
1992).

28

H em isphere • Volume Six, N um ber Three

Latin American participation in
peace-observing activities has hardly
been restricted to UN operations.
W ithin the Organization of
American States (OAS) there have
been num erous small civilian-mili
tary peace-observing efforts m ount
ed in response to border tensions

and other strains. Unfortunately,
the OAS’s only attem pt to create an
Inter-American Peace Force (in the
Dom inican Republic in 1965) result
ed only in profound distrust of such
an international force, mainly be
cause it was evident that the IAPF
was largely a US operation which
employed the multilateral organ as a
cover for unilateral political objec
tives.
C h a n g in g N a t u r e

of

P e a c e k e e p in g

W hat is new today is the dramatic
expansion o f U nited Nations peace
keeping activities, and the growing
participation of certain Latin
American military establishments
(most notably A rgentina’s) in these
UN efforts. In a period when civilian
leaders are searching for ways to
redefine the m ilitary’s mission, these
UN peacekeeping roles are some
times seen as prom ising ways to give
the military a real role. Civilian gov
ernm ents also hope participation
will direct military attention away
from internal political issues, and
perhaps reduce the military estab
lishm ent’s size and cost. In some
cases international peacekeeping is
also perceived as a way of regaining
a positive image and prestige lost
during periods of repression of
hum an rights. Finally, participation
in UN peacekeeping can also be a
useful bargaining chip in the world
arena. In the Argentine case, partic
ipation in UN peacekeeping and
o ther multilateral operations such as
the Gulf War and the Haiti em bar
go, has served to strengthen its
unusually close curren t relationship
with the U nited States.
In retrospect, the Central
American peacekeeping experience
from the late 1980s to date was a key

Features: A rgentina

Argentina finds a future for its armed forces

turning point. The U nited N ation’s
two operations (ONUCA in Central
America—specifically Nicaragua—
and ONUSAL in El Salvador) repre
sent the first time the world body
has m ounted a peacekeeping opera
tion in the Western Hem isphere.
T here was a substantial contribution
of troops m ade by Venezuela (a
700-plus paratrooper battalion
em ployed to convince the “contras”
to disarm ), and a no less notable
naval contribution by Argentina,
which deployed patrol boats to the
Gulf o f Fonseca. U nited Nations
m ilitary observers were also provid
ed by Argentina, as well as Ecuador,
Venezuela, Brazil, and Colombia,
and, in the case of ONUSAL, Chile
and Mexico provided police instruc
tors. These Latin American military
and police officers, wearing the blue
berets and insignia o f the UN,
worked side by side with two new
players in Western Hem ispheric
security matters, Canada and Spain.
T he presence o f both of these coun
tries was significant: Canada because
of its previously low profile in hem i
spheric affairs (contrasting with its
long experience in UN peacekeep
ing) , and Spain because of the rele
vant example o f that nation’s mili
tary in the transition from a long
dictatorship to a viable democracy.
In ONUCA/ONUSAL Latin
American officers were extensively
exposed to the culture of UN peace
keeping, including the m inutiae of
operational problem s stemming
from different languages, logistical
systems, and political backgrounds.
T heir involvement, however, was not
unanim ously welcomed. A num ber
of Latin American military officers
serving in ONUCA/ONUSAL had
what was euphemistically called

Latin American Military Expenditures
Francisco Rojas Aravena
• The end of the Cold War has not led to significant changes in Latin
American military spending. Despite the peace process in El Salvador
and elsewhere, the inertia of the Cold War continues in Central
America. In South America, the end of the Cold War did not alter per
ceptions of threat and notions of national defense in any significant
manner. A key determ inant of defense spending in South America is
the prevalence of border issues.
• Regional military spending is primarily determ ined by the past; that is,
the reiterative process of resource allocation (criimo histmico de asignaciori). The “personal” line item is the most im portant factor.
Research has demonstrated that the armed forces are able to lobby on
behalf of their own bureaucracies and budgets on a yearly basis. Only a
profound financial restriction has a meaningful impact on military
spending. International agreements appear to be one alternative which
will allow the consolidation of stability while reaping the dividends of
peace.
• Even considering individual variation among cases, military spending
in Latin America is affected by the domestic political conditions in each
country. Politically stable countries (such as Argentina and Chile) must
be contrasted with those facing problems of governability (Brazil,
Venezuela, and the nations of Central America) or open conflicts with
either drug traffickers or insurgent forces (Colombia and Peru). These
domestic political conditions affect the annual process of lobbying for
budget allotments.
• A major factor affecting the stability of spending patterns during the
post Cold War period is the lack of a common threat. The absence of
an extra-continental enemy has contributed to the inability of the
region to define global security policies. This trend, however, has not
prevented the acquisition of the new generation of weapons so promi
nently showcased by the LIS during the Persian Gulf War.
• The general trend in Latin America has been toward a slight reduction
in military spending. There is evidence of a small decrease in Central
America; in South America, military spending remained constant at
approximately two percent of GDP. In the latter case, the last half of the
continued on page 31
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“unhelpful hum an rights back
g rounds” earn ed while engaged in
counterinsurgency operations in
their own countries. T here were
charges that these same individuals
h ad a tendency in some cases to side
with the Nicaraguan contras and the
Salvadoran security forces. T here
were also criticisms of the propriety
of Argentine military officers pro
tecting the hum an rights of Central
Americans, and of Mexican police
officials teaching professional
integrity to the newly-formed
Salvadoran police forces.
T h e A r g e n t in e C a se

T here have been rem arkable
changes in both the Argentine mili
tary and that country’s international
relations in the past decade. The
starting point for this shift can be
traced back to the searing experi
ence o f a long and harsh military
dictatorship and A rgentina’s decisive
defeat in 1982 at the hands o f Great
Britain. The process o f change
began un d er the Alfonsin adminis
tration, and accelerated under the
presidency of Carlos M enem.
As a result, Argentina is now the
m ost active Latin Am erican support
er of UN peacekeeping missions,
and also an enthusiastic proponent
o f CBMs to reduce tensions in the
Southern Cone. T here is some
opposition to these new roles, bu t in
general they seem to be well accept
ed by both military and civilian sec
tors. It would be simplistic to con
clude that this m eans that the
Argentine military has perm anently
renounced intervention in politics,
but it has resulted in the formal
acceptance of international peace
keeping as an Army role, albeit a
secondary one. T here are also
intriguing suggestions that the
Argentine "test case” may be trans
ferable to o th er Latin American mil
itary institutions, possibly through
the establishm ent o f a regional
peacekeeping training center in
Argentina. An alternate proposal
30
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would give the Inter-American
Defense Board a role in planning,
analyzing and publicizing Latin
American involvement in UN peace
keeping missions and using the
Inter-American Defense College as
the vehicle for transm itting this
knowledge to individuals (civilian as
well as military) who m ight be
involved in future such missions.

Quotes a captain: “I was
trained to kill. This business
about soldiers deployed for
the purpose of avoiding
war seems foreign to
everything I knew... ”

A rgentina’s support for the
UNPROFOR peacekeeping force in
Croatia represents a m ajor contribu
tion. T he battalion, transported by
the Argentine Air Force, went with
its own organic vehicles and com m u
nications equipm ent. It was no t a
typical A rgentine Army infantry bat
talion: it was heavily officered, and
deliberately so in order to help
insure a high level of professional
ism, as well as to rotate the majority
of the ju n io r officers in the
Argentine Army through a UN
peacekeeping experience via
6-month reliefs of personnel.
According to Army C hief of Staff
General M artin Balza, in Ju n e 1993
its composition was 14 field grade
officers, 113 ju n io r officers, and 757
NCOs. Overall Argentine participa
tion in UN peacekeeping, he added,
has grown from an average o f 20 sol
diers in the 1983-89 period to 100 in
1991 and 3850 in 1993.
O ne measure of A rgentina’s expe
rience in Croatia can be seen in
newspaper coverage of President
M enem ’s trip to inspect the
Argentine battalion (accom panied

by General Balza) in mid-1992.
Selected quotes from a 2 August
1992 Clarin article illustrate the
im pact of the mission: “the experi
ence is absolutely atypical for
A rgentine Army personnel...As well
as being an investigation into past
and present military conduct, the
report is also a reflection on the
tools that will be used to build a new
Army...Quotes a captain: “I was
trained to kill. This business about
soldiers deployed for the purpose of
avoiding war seems foreign to every
thing I knew”...the Argentine Blue
Helm ets are involved in an experi
m ent destined to have a consider
able im pact on their military culture
and change their outlook...they are
also learning term s such as “m inori
ty rights,” now incorporated into
their professional language as keys
to the success of their missions.”
P ropo nents

and

O pponents

Proponents of peacekeeping roles
for the Latin American military
include those who stress support for
the world body, as well as altruistic
contributions to the achievem ent of
peace. It is also true that individual
soldiers usually profit financially
from UN service, as do many of
their governments, depending on
the arrangem ents m ade with UN
H eadquarters. The military institu
tions also benefit professionally from
the training and experience they
derive from such service. From a
national perspective, service in UN
peacekeeping missions tends to ele
vate the profile and prestige o f the
country. Finally, for a military insti
tution like A rgentina’s, still laden
with the baggage of years of military
dictatorship, the “Dirty War,” and
the fiasco of the Falklands/M alvinas
defeat, involvement in UN peace
keeping offers the opportunity to
recover some of the prestige and
self-respect lost in that period. The
fact that almost 25% o f the officers
and non-comm issioned officers of
the Argentine Army now have
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international peacekeeping experi
ence has profound significance for
the institution.
Service in UN peacekeeping mis
sions also reinforces the ties o f mili
tary transnationalism by building on
the cam araderie o f shared experi
ences with soldiers o f many nations.
As an example, General Balza
rem arked that he had been deeply
moved by a handw ritten condolence
note sent to him after two Argentine
soldiers were killed while on UN
duty in Croatia. T he note came
from retired British General Jerem y
M oore— the m an who had led the
British forces in the Falklands/
Malvinas campaign in which General
Balza had been an artillery com m an
der.
T he new concepts and approaches
concerning peacekeeping have not
received unanim ous approval from
the Latin American military. In
Central America, the right wing in
general, especially in El Salvador,
reacted violently to the notion of
U nited Nations involvement in what
they perceived as their sovereign
internal affairs. A typical extrem e
view was th at UN intervention in the
context o f peacekeeping and hum an
rights observation was a neo-Marxist
plot. According to this view, UN
activities in this field would weaken
the state and leave it ripe for a
takeover by leftist elem ents within
their nation. Those holding this
view would also argue that the
demise o f the Soviet U nion did not
m ean the disappearance of Marxist
insurgents in their country.
O thers see international peace
keeping missions as an “internation
alizing” or “den atu ring” of the most
basic national institution: the mili
tary. By involvement in these out
side missions, they argue, the mili
tary is diverted from its fundam ental
mission o f defense o f national sover
eignty and weakens its roots in the
national body politic to the point
that the nation itself is endangered.
O pposition to confidence-building

continued from page 2 9

1980s witnessed an appreciable decline in military spending relative to
central government expenditures (from 6.8% in 1986 to 5.3% in 1991).
• Legislatures throughout Latin America have been notably absent from
the decision making process with respect to military spending. National
budgets are generally decided by the executive branch behind closed
doors with little or no public or legislative scrutiny. It should come as
no surprise that military spending would fit the same pattern. This, of
course, is not surprising as closed decision making styles are also evident
in the making of economic policy.
• Military spending in Latin America in the wake of the Cold War peri
od has not been based on sound defense policies. Given the lack of clear
objectives and goals, it is difficult to measure the efficiency of military
spending. Moreover, all debate regarding military spending in Latin
America tends to be ideological and elitist. This makes the formulation
of sound defense policies more difficult. Broader debate on defense
matters would increase the transparency and accountability of military
spending patterns and generate policy options that could be supported
by other socio-political actors. ■

M i l i t a r y S p e n d in g in S o u t h A m e r ic a (a s a p e r c e n t a g e o f

Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Guyana
Paraguay
Peru
Surinam
Uruguay
Venezuela
South America

GDP)

1981

1985

1989

1990

1991

3.8
3.3
0.7
3.8
1.0
3.4
4.4
1.5
4.2
NA
4.0
1.0
1.9

3.8
NA
0.8
4.1
1.6
2.8
8.5
1.1
6.5
2.7
2.9
1.0
2.0

3.5
3.6
1.5
3.4
2.0
1.8
1.9
1.4
NA
2.6
2.5
2.3
2.0

2.6
3.5
1.7
3.6
2.3
2.1
1.3
1.3
1.8
4.0
2.5
2.0
2.0

1.9
2.4
1.3
3.4
2.6
2.1
1.0
1.7
1.1
3.8
2.1
3.6
1.8

Source: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military
Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1994. NA: not available.

Material from this inset originally appeared in Gasto Militar en America
Latina: Procesos de Decisiones y Adores Claves (Santiago: Cinde/FIACSO,
1994). The author, Francisco Rojas Aravena, is coordinator of die
Department of International and Military Relations at the Facultad
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) in Santiago, Chile.
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measures has centered on a similar
view which holds that CBMs are
nothing m ore than a thinly-disguised civilian plot to use dim in
ished threats as an excuse to dram at
ically cut back the military.
Finally, the fact that many o f the
ideas regarding CBMs and peace
keeping seem to come from the
“gringos to the n o rth ” (and m ore
recently the “gringos from the far
n o rth ,” i.e., Canada) stirs up resent
m ent. O pponents recall the years
when US academics and policymak
ers proposed num erous new mis
sions and fanciful schemes to change
the roles o f the Latin American mili
tary in ways that seemed to serve US
policy interests m ore than the needs
of Latin Americans themselves.
P rospects

Despite objections to peacekeep
ing roles, confidence-building m ea
sures and cooperative security, it
seems clear that many of the Latin
American military establishments
will be considering and im plem ent
ing these concepts in the years
ahead. For the generally small mili
tary establishments of Central
America the most significant influ
ence will be the im pact that peace
keeping and CBMs had (and will
continue to have) in the Central
American peace process. Because of
their size and limited capabilities it
is unlikely that these militaries will
be asked to participate significantly
in UN peacekeeping operations.
For the larger military establish
ments o f South America, UN peace
keeping represents a significant,
although secondary role for them to
play on the world scene. The
Argentine example is illustrative
here in the way its strong participa
tion in UN peacekeeping in the last
few years has been an im portant
instrum ent of A rgentina’s foreign
policy as well as potentially rehabili
tating a military which lost prestige
and m orale during a dark period
o f its history. A rgentina’s involve
32
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m ent in UN peacekeeping, and its
historically unprecedented collabo
ration with the U nited States, are
being watched carefully by the other
military establishments o f the hem i
sphere.
The im pact of these new roles on
civil-military relations and the
process of dem ocratization is a deli
cate one. Attempts to link these
roles too closely to reductions in mil
itary budgets and influence are like
ly to backfire. And yet, there is the
obvious im plication that CBMs and
cooperative security can make
inter-state conflict in Latin America
less likely, and thus perm it a m ore
realistic assessment of genuine mili
tary needs, as well as perm itting a
certain am ount of military resources
to be m ade available to the UN for
peacekeeping missions.
The present m om ent is also one
of reassessment of roles for the m ul
tilateral institutions of hem ispheric
security, especially the InterAmerican Defense Board and
College. Their continued existence
is being seriously questioned, and
their survival may well rest on their
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ability to focus on international
peacekeeping, CBMs, and coopera
tive security as their prim ary area of
interest.
The role o f the U nited States in
this process m ust be a careful one.
An over-eager attem pt to push these
new roles on the Latin American
military is likely to be counter-productive. It would be far wiser to
allow the Latin Am erican militaries,
working closely with their civilian
political leadership, to determ ine
the pace and direction of these new
approaches. Fortunately, there are
o ther nations with m ore experience
than the LTnited States in these fields
which have indicated an interest in
working with Latin American mili
taries. Canada and Spain are in the
forefront here, and their consider
able involvement in the Central
American peace process (as well as
in UN missions elsewhere) should
be used as a vehicle for showing the
advantages of greater participation
in UN peacekeeping, confidencebuilding measures, and cooperative
security arrangem ents with all the
nations of the hem isphere. ■
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Forgotten Minority
M artin Edwin Andersen

n the wake of the 1994 revolt
in Chiapas, Mexico,
Argentine President Carlos
S. M enem suddenly put his
country’s security services on
heightened alert. Although
a continent away from the Mexican
strife, M enem warned that a
“Chiapas-style” rebellion was possible
against the governm ent in Buenos
Aires. Even M enem ’s supporters
scoffed at the idea as preposterous—
Argentine ambassador to
W ashington Raul Granillo Ocam po
later flatly denied any similarity
between events in Mexico and those
in his country. Yet, however alarmist
or politically calculating, Menem
raised a specter ignored by many
ensconced in the European comforts
of Buenos Aires—from La Quiaca in
the n o rth to the Straits of Magellan
in the south, Argentine Indians still
struggle for survival.
As late as 1993, official Argentina
pointedly ignored the country’s esti
m ated 100,000 to one million Native
Americans. N either census data nor
annual governm ent statistics counted
Indians as a distinct category. This
disregard was not limited to the
bureaucrats in the Rio de la Plata:
Edgar Krebs, an Argentine academic
teaching at Wolfson College, Oxford,
said he was startled to find that
World Bank docum ents were written
as if there were no Indians in
Argentina.

I

Martin Edwin Andersen is the author
of Dossier Secreto: A rgentina’s
Desaparecidos and the Myth of the
“Dirty War” (Boulder: Westview, 1993)
He is a senior consultant at the Center
for Democracy in Washington, DC.
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The lack of precise governm ent
inform ation helps to account for the
wildly disparate estimates on Indian
populations. According to some cal
culations, 300,000 Native Americans
live in their own communities, while
as many as 1.5 million have emigrat
ed to urban areas. The National
Aboriginal Pastoral Team (Equipo
National Pastoral Aborigen) has put
the total num ber at 447,000 people
clustered in 13 ethnic groups. O f
these, 170,000 are Kolias, 90,000
Mapuches, 80,000 Wichis, and
60,000 Tobas. O ther groups include
the Chiriguanos, Pilagas, Matacos,
Teheulches, and the mixed-race
Ona-Criollos and Yamana-Criollos.

“The struggle today is for
our own territory. Not just
a property title that
assures our right to a
piece of land...
Although Indian com m unities dot
the length of the country, the prob
lems they face unite them: lack of
their own land; illiteracy; unemploy
m ent and exploitation in the work
place; and a host of physical mal
adies ranging from childhood mal
nutrition to tuberculosis, cholera,
alcoholism, and venereal disease. In
some communities, infant mortality
is estimated to be as high as 40 per
cent. A rgentina’s indigenous peo
ples are also increasingly united in
dem anding that the governm ent
provide answers to their dem ands
for fair and equitable treatment.
Argentine society, however, has been
slow to recognize the dramatic con

ditions facing their Native American
compatriots. According to anthro
pologist Carlos Martinez Sarasola,
author of the critically acclaimed
book Nuestros paisanos los indios, the
attitude of the M enem governm ent
is even worse. “A few o f its most
recent statem ents,” he told the
Buenos Aires daily La Nation shortly
after the Chiapas uprising, “show
m ore than a hint of a recurring seg
regationist attitude.”
The first Native American settlers
came to the territory that is now
Argentina some 12,000 years ago. By
the time the first Spanish conquerors
arrived, there were between 500,000
and one million Native Americans
divided into 23 distinct ethnic
groups. The encomienda system insti
tuted by the Spanish crown gave
colonists power over local tribes and
allowed them to collect tribute from
the Indians. A nother colonial insti
tution, the merced, gave the settlers
territorial rights; those Indians living
in these newly-demarcated areas
were forced to work for the lan d ’s
new owners. In 1813, an effective
ly— if no t formally— independent
Argentina abolished the encomienda.
The mercedes land grants awarded by
the Spanish crown, however, contin
ued to be recognized as property
rights by the new government.
Beginning in the mid-16th century,
Araucanians from Chile em barked
on a process of commercial relation
ships and interm arriages that
extended their influence from the
n orth of Patagonia to a point south
of the provincial capital o f Cordoba.
With the Araucanians came the
M apuche language and customs
from the other side of the Andes.
Often this cultural penetration came
at the expense of Spanish settlers
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Native Americans in Argentina

pushing inward from the Rio de la
Plata. Helping to solidify this new
Indian civilization was the fact that
by the end of the 17th century, the
Chilean Araucania was an indepen
dent territory with formal, and large
ly cordial, relations with colonial
administrators. The resulting loyalty
of the Native American leadership to
the Spanish crown (also due in part
to the influence of the royalist-lean
ing Franciscan O rd e r), and a series
o f attem pts by pro-Independence
forces to underm ine the tribal chiefs,
brought the Indians increasingly into
conflict with the em erging nations of
Chile and Argentina. As fortunes
tu rn ed against Spain, Native
Americans and royalist whites left
Chile for the expanse o f A rgentina’s
grasslands and deserts, from whence
they could regroup and plot.
A round the time o f independence,
an effort was m ade to integrate the
Native Americans living in the pam
pas into A rgentina’s European soci
ety. The attem pt foundered, howev
er, on the Indians’ illiteracy in
Spanish, and the consequent suspen
sion of their citizenship. The debate
in criollo society about the role of
Indians in the new Argentine nation
continued to be shrouded in ambi
guity. Notes Krebs: “The predom i
nant them e was the impossibility of
o ur side understanding what the
o ther side is thinking.” Aristotelian
concepts about “thinking and
unthinking peoples” were offered
side-by-side with declarations such as,
“An Indian is an Indian, and we can
not force the condition of being an
Argentine upon them .” Even the
enlightened constitutionalist Juan
Bautista Alberdi, pondering the furi
ous division over how to deal with
the country’s original inhabitants,

ventured that Argentines should not
leave “islands o f barbarism ” within
their country.
Integrationist hopes, and even the
divide-and-conquer paternalism of
dictator Ju an Manuel de Rosas, were
followed with periodic exterm ination
campaigns, such as one led by
Colonel Federico Rauch, in which
the Unitarian governm ent of Buenos
Aires ordered him to “destroy the
Chilean Indians.” Native American
collaborators were not to be given
any quarter: their women, children,
cattle, and horses were rem anded to
the possession o f the state. “Animals,
jewelry and the tribes’ belongings,” it
was ordered, “will belong to the
troops and the militias.”

...Our cause has to do with
our development and a
strategy for living. ”
—M apuche leader Jorge Nahuel

In the 1870s and 1880s, while the
US wound down its own Indian wars,
Argentina undertook a final cam
paign to wipe out Native American
presence in the pampas. General
Roca’s “Conquest of the D esert” sub
jugated and occupied northern
Patagonia, putting the finishing
touches on the dom ination of Native
Americans and reducing the Indians
to virtual slaves.
The quandary faced by 19th centu
ry Argentine thinkers, about how to
deal with “the O th er”— the non-criollo
com patriot—reem erged with Juan
P eron’s reign (1946-1955). Although
his governm ent lacked a specifically

pro-Indian policy, the enactm ent of a
statute regulating rural labor and the
incorporation of the working class—
its ranks swollen by darker-skinned
immigrants from the interior o f the
country—into A rgentina’s political
and economic life, won Peron a
degree of sympathy from the
n ation’s Indian communities. (Those
with long memories, however,
recalled the events of August 1946:
Shortly after Peron took power, a
group of Kolia Indians—given the
sobriquet of “the Indian raid of
Peace” (el vialon de la paz)—traveled
to Buenos Aires from the northwest
province of Salta. U pon their arrival,
and after a trip that took almost a
m onth, they were beaten by police
and put on a train back to the salteno
departm ent of O ran u n d er arm ed
guard. Several died.) Because of the
largely favorable treatm ent, at the
end of P eron’s nearly decade-long
reign, the young novelist Ernesto
Sabato wrote:
“While we doctors, farm-owners
and writers were noisily rejoicing in
the living room over the fall of the
tyrant, in the corner of the kitchen I
saw how two young Indian women
who worked there had their eyes
drenched with tears. And although
in all those years I had m editated
upon the tragic duality that divided
the Argentine people, at that
m om ent it appeared to me in its
most moving form...Many millions
o f dispossessed people and workers
were shedding tears at that instant,
for them a hard and sober m om ent.
Great m ultitudes of their hum ble
compatriots were symbolized by
those two Indian girls who wept in
a kitchen in Salta.”
The division of opinion over what
to do about the Indians spanned a
H em isphere • Volume Six, N um ber Three
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succession of hapless civilian govern
m ents and right wing military
regimes. In the early 1970s
M onsignor Enrique Angelelli, the
bishop of M enem ’s own province of
La Rioja, found him self ministering
to a region o f large landholders and
Indian peons. Angelelli, who was
m urdered by the military regime in
1976, used parables mixed with local
rites and traditions to convince
native parishioners to abandon feel
ings of racial inferiority. T hroughout
Argentina, land reform advocates,
and even orphanages for Indian chil
dren, were targets of allegedly inde
p en d en t right-wing death squads
working in collusion with the mili
tary.
With the retu rn of democracy in
1983, neglect rather than repression
characterized the treatm ent of
Indians. A 1985 study by the
Parliam entary Inform ation Office
(Direction de Information
Parlamentaria) found that, of the 200
pages of statutes and regulations con
cerning Indians, none offered
indigenous causes m uch support. It
was only in 1989, fifteen years after it
was presented by Radical Party
Senator Fernando de la Rtia, that
Parliam ent passed Law 23302, which
established a National Institute of
Indigenous Affairs (Institute National
de Asuntos Indtgenas, INAT). Indian
leaders hailed the measure as the
first legislative effort which utilized
Native American ideas and lacked a
heavy overlay of paternalism.
Although their indigenous activism
pales in com parison to the hundreds
of thousands of Indians who have
mobilized to protest in Ecuador and
Bolivia, or the peasant insurgencies
of Mexico and Guatemala,
A rgentina’s Native Americans have
won increasing attention to their
struggle. In 1992, some 200 repre
sentatives o f the M apuche in
A rgentina and Chile m et in the cen
tral Argentine city o f N euquen to dis
cuss how to create a new nation and
recover part of their ancestral territo
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ries. (As a tribal group, the estimat
ed 50-90,000 Mapuches have been
one of the most resistant to attempts
to destroy their culture. They have
m ade a strong effort to hold onto
their traditions and original lan
guage as a cornerstone of their own
identity.) In 1993, Kolia Indians
from O ran in Salta province went to
Buenos Aires to dem and the return
of lands stolen from their ancestors
three centuries ago. For three weeks
they cam ped in front of the Con
gress building while carrying out a
hunger strike. Last August, fourteen
Indian groups descended on the
provincial capital of Santa Fe to
make their views known to the
C onstituent Assembly considering
reform s to the Argentine
Constitution. For the first time,
Indian rights were enshrined in the
country’s m agna carta under a modi
fication of Article 67. Approved by
acclamation, it declared that
Argentina:
“Recognizes the ethnic and cultur
al preexistence of A rgentina’s indige
nous peoples; guarantees respect for
their identity and the right to bilin
gual and multi-cultural education;
recognizes the legal existence of
their communities, and the posses
sion and title of the lands they tradi
tionally occupy, and regulates the
handing out of others suitable and
sufficient for hum an development,
none of which will be alienable,
transferrable nor subject to taxes or
embargoes; and assures their partic
ipation efforts concerning natural
resources and other interests that
affect them. The provinces can also
concurrently exercise these attri
butes.”
In referring to the “handing o u t”
of other lands, the word “guarantee”
was originally used in place of “regu
late,” but the initial draft was watered
down at the insistence of M enem ’s
Peronists. They claimed that by
"guaranteeing” land, the Assembly
was risking multi-million dollar law
suits by Indians against the state. Oil

companies were also reportedly con
cerned about what the language
m eant to their interests, particularly
regarding subsoil rights. “Everyone
will be grappling for a basis for argu
m ent,” said Krebs, “and it will likely
be quite messy.”
C ontinued gains by A rgentina’s
Indians, however, may be threatened
by the Menem governm ent’s seem
ing willingness to make them scape
goats or bogeymen. It was revealed
in late 1994 that, shortly after the
Chiapas uprising, Argentine military
and intelligence services were train
ing Mexican army and police offi
cials in counterinsurgency tactics,
both in Buenos Aires and in the field
in Chiapas. In both countries—
where memories of the misnamed
“dirty war” carried out in the mid1970s to early 1980s by the Argentine
military still cut deeply— the move
was widely condem ned. Similar ques
tions arose about w hether the
Argentine military was engaged in a
reprise in Mexico o f activities—the
prom otion of death squads and bru
tal interrogation techniques—it used
in Central and South America dur
ing the period of the “dirty war.”
Following revelations in the
Mexican and A rgentine press,
M enem denied that active-duty
A rgentine officers were engaged in
Chiapas. Still, sources in Buenos
Aires familiar with military intelli
gence say the use o f retirees as
plausibly-deniable “cut-outs” has
been a com m on practice. In
November, M enem appeared to
endorse the same repressive
m ethodology that earn ed several
form er military com m anders prison
sentences for crimes against hum an
ity. “It was thanks to the presence
of the arm ed forces,” M enem said,
“that we fought and trium phed in
that dirty war which took o u r com
m unity to the brink o f collapse.”
T he im plications of that message
could no t be clearer in Mexico
and in Indian com m unities in
Argentina. I
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A Portrait of Cuba
M anuel Ruiz-Barrera

Nursing Home (Asilo de Ancianos), Havana, 1994

Manuel Ruiz-Barrera is a student of fine arts and history at Florida International University. He travels and photographs extensively in Cuba.
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Photo Essay: Cuba

The Long Road Doivn (El largo viaje hacia abajo), Camaguey, 1993
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Photo Essay: Cuba

Capitolio Games (Juegos en el Capitolio), Havana, 1993
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Manolo, Camagiiey, 1994
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Yearningfor the Sea (Anorando el mar), Havana, 1994
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The Viking of El Salvador
Tricia Juhn

es, it broadcast an endless stream of
lethally dull editorials, live front-line
news, and re-enacted battle reports.
Rebel Radio has a great deal of
hum or in it, particularly when it
chronicles the frenetic couplings of
Venceremos’s staff (the ratio of m en to
women was seven to one) and the
he journalist Jose
courting of the raven-haired beauty,
Ignacio Lopez Vigil
compa Marcela. Com petition for her
has com piled this oral
tender mercies drives two of the m en
history of Radio
to ‘joust like erran t knights,” and
Venceremos (“We shall
produces such delightful outbursts as
trium ph”), the clan
“oh mama, so many curves and me
destine radio station of the Frente
without brakes!” (it does lose some
Farabundo Marti para la Liberation
thing in the translation, otherwise
National (FMLN)—a coalition of
smoothly executed by Mark Fried).
insurgents who m ade war on the
Venceremos’s broadcasts also featured
Salvadoran governm ent from 1981a num ber of serials spoofing the real1992. Revolving around a cast of a
life panoram a’s major players. US
dozen or so principals, the story
embassy staff tuned in on a regular
begins with Comandante Jonas show
basis to hear what was happening to
ing up at the first speaker’s hom e in
“a gringo m arrying a Salvadoran
Mexico to work out the technicalities
wom an” (as US Ambassador Deane
of an underground guerrilla radio
H inton eventually d id ); or to hear
broadcast. Jonas wants an AM sta
Venceremos’&impression o f General
tion that can be heard in the capital
Eugenio Vides Casanova—form er
city. The first broadcasts began in
Minister of Defense—reciting a
1979, courtesy of an antique sixtyShakespearean sonnet.
pound transmitter, the “Valiant
Even the most elastic definition of
Viking,” taken from a fishing boat.
broadcast journalism would not
During the war, Radio Venceremos's
encompass Venceremos’s unverified
main accom plishm ent was to keep
rebel assertions, but sometimes it was
broadcasting, despite the Salvadoran
the best available facsimile. By the
army’s attem pts to find the transmit
early 1980s, the army and the death
ter and shut it down. Venceremos’s
squads had effectively shut down the
team was practically a mobile army
independent and opposition media
unit, and, brags one storyteller, it
in El Salvador; Venceremos turned out
could bug out of a locale in fourteen
to be telling the truth about things
minutes. From bat caves and trenchthe governm ent placidly denied.
Most notable in this category was the
1981 massacre at El Mozote, where
Tricia Juhn is deputy editor of
the army killed thousands of peas
H em isphere. She served in the Interants in a single counterinsurgency
American Foundation's Office for
campaign. Venceremos broadcast news
Central America during the final year
of El Mozote immediately, while the
of the Salvadoran Civil War.
US and Salvadoran governments
Rebel Radio: The Story o f El
Salvador’s Radio Venceremos
By Jose Ignacio Lopez Vigil
Translated by Mark Fried
Willimantic, CT: Curbstone Press, 1994.
288 pp.
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denied it for m ore than a decade.
Only with the release of the United
Nations-sponsored R eport of the
T ruth Commission (1993) and Mark
D anner’s flawless profile in the New
Yorker (Decem ber 6, 1993), was the
truth of El Mozote disinterred.
The campaign to shut down
Venceremos led to the 1984 death of
lie u te n a n t Colonel Domingo
Monterrosa, whom the FMLN
dubbed the “butcher of El Mozote.”
M onterrosa’s m en seized a “Trojan”
version of the Viking, which had
been wired with explosives. W hen
the helicopter containing
M onterrosa and the transm itter lift
ed off to head for a press confer
ence, a rem ote switch ignited eight
sticks of dynamite.
The folksy, front-porch delivery of
these anecdotes should not, however,
obscure the distinctly bellicose raison
d ’etre of Venceremos. Ideology is only a
small part of this volume; which is
another way of saying that the rav
ages of that war are presented in a
light-hearted, innocent fashion, as if
the FMLN were not also engaged in
generating its fair share of slaugh
tered innocents, betrayals, and abort
ed peace negotiations. While its
deviations from the conventions of
war cannot measure up to those of
its opponents, neither should one
accept this volum e’s rom antic remi
niscences of life during wartime.
Three things contributed to the
spectacular success of the FMLN:
The first was the intractability of the
ruling regimes in El Salvador; the
second was the sheer military tenaci
ty of the FMLN; and the third was its
propaganda machine, a constant
thorn in the side of the counterinsur
gents. So impressive was this last ele
m ent that in 1983, with the Reagan
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adm inistration growing increasingly
vitriolic about the com m unist m en
ace in El Salvador, France and
Mexico recognized the FMLN as a
“legitimate political force, with all
the rights and responsibilities
derived therefrom .” The FMLN
established networks o f sympathizers
in the US and Europe, where ordi
nary citizens gave cash to its cause,
entreated their elected representa
tives in one direction or another, and
helped bring the Salvadoran war into
the legislative chambers of foreign
governments.
By 1987, the governm ent of
N apoleon Duarte (1984-1989) was
forced to counteract its plum m eting
international legitimacy by devoting
scarce resources to a kind of counter
propaganda network in Europe (in
the US, it m ade do with a high-pro
file ambassador, Ernesto Rivas
Gallont). Likewise, a major turning
point on the road to peace came
during the presidency of Alfredo
Cristiani (1989-1994), who early on
directed his European diplomatic
staff to cease and desist all antiFMLN propaganda as a dem onstra
tion of his com m itm ent to negotia
tions without quarter.
The jo b of propaganda, like social
science, is to insist upon a certain
version of history. In the final analy
sis, Rebel Radio is m ore propaganda,
told in a jocular fashion, both selfprom oting and self-effacing. With
the war over, the stakes o f Vence
remos'%broadcasts are not quite as
lethal as they once were: The mo
m entum toward national reconcilia
tion moves even form er combatants
to face the future with a selective
memory. Venceremos is now a legiti
mate business operation, playing top
40 in the capital city. ■
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Elections in Latin America
M arian Goslinga
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platform
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1993
and the end
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1994, eleven countries
cal parties.]
in Latin America
scheduled elections
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with centrist candi
The Reverse Coattails Effect: Local
dates claiming victory in the majori
Party Organization in the 1989
ty of cases. The attached bibliogra
Brazilian Presidential Election.
phy shows that electoral democracy
Barry Ames. American Political
has m ade significant gains in the
Science Review, v. 88 (March 1994),
region. Even Haiti, long considered
pp. 95-111.
an anomaly, ousted a military dicta
torship to retu rn Jean-B ertrand
Aristide to office. Nevertheless, the
C hile
literature also indicates that extrem 
Claves del proceso politico: apreists on the left and right still have
ciacion sistemica de las elecciones
the potential to disrupt the dem oc
de diciembre. Francisco Javier
ratic process.
Cuadra. Santiago, Chile: Centro
de Estudios Publicos; 1994. 13 pp.
A r g e n t i n a
[Analyzes the results of 1993 Chilean
elections.]
The 1993 Argentine Elections.
Ernesto Cabrera, Maria Victoria
(Las) elecciones de 1993. Oscar
Murillo. Electoral Studies, v. 13
Godoy Arcaya. Estudios Publicos
(June 1994), pp. 150-156.
(Chile), (Fall 1994), pp. 301-337.
[Discusses C hile’s Decem ber 1993
Third Party Voting in Argentina:
Ecological Analysis o f the 1991
elections.]
Elections. Fabian Echegaray,
G erardo Adrogue. La Jolla, CA:
C o l o m b i a
C enter for Iberian and Latin
Nuevo congreso: curules por herencia.
American Studies, University of
Semana (Colombia), n. 621 (March
California, San Diego; 1994. 52 pp.
29-April 5, 1994), pp. 34-37. [Despite
constitutional changes designed to
B olivia
eliminate clientelism and nepotism,
22 relatives o f form er politicians
Foro politico electoral 1993: los
were elected in the congressional
programas de los partidos. H.C.F.
elections of March 13, 1994.]
Mansilla, Carlos F. Toranzo Roca,
eds. La Paz, Bolivia: Instituto
Latinoam ericano de Investigaciones
C o s t a R ica
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Costa Rica: la reafirmacion del
bipartidismo. Oscar Fernandez.
Nueva Sociedad, no. 131 (May-June
1994), pp. 4-10. [Com m ents on the
February 6, 1994 election.]
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Democracia y proceso electoral en
Republica Dominicana. Pablo A.
Marinez. Santo Domingo: Omega;
1994. 271 pp. [Examines political
developm ents in the Dominican
Republic.]
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Ecuador: protestas sociales y
elecciones. Osvaldo Leon. A LAI
Servicio Informativo, v. 18, n. 190
(May 4, 1994), pp. 2-12. [Author
argues that the incum bent Partido
Social Cristiano won E cuador’s May
1994 congressional elections despite
public disillusionm ent with the polit
ical system.]
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El Salvador Tries to Vote. Steve
Cagan. The Nation, v. 258, n. 15,
(April 18, 1994), pp. 523-525.
El Salvador: elecciones y democra
cia. H ector Dada. Nueva Sociedad
(July-August 1994), pp. 22-28.
(Las) elecciones generates de 1994:
consolidation de la hegemonia de
ARENA. Carlos Acevedo. Estudios
Centroamericanos, v. 49, nos. 545-546
(March-April 1994), pp. 195-211.
Elections: The Right Consolidates
Power. George Vickers, Jack
Spence. NACLA Report on the
Americas, v. 28 (July-August 1994),
pp. 6-11.
Patria o gente! analisis de la campaha de ARENA y de la coalition.
Xavier Obach. Estudios Centroameri
canos, v. 49, nos. 545-546.
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La mayoria de la minoria. H aroldo
Shetemul, Silvio Gramajo. Cronica
(Guatemala), v. 7, no. 336 (August
1994), pp. 19-23. [Argues that Guate
mala's newly elected congress is not
representative, as scarcely fifteen
percent of the population voted.]
H
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Partido Liberal gana elecciones en
Honduras. Instituto Centroam ericano de Estudios Politicos.
Panorama Gentroamericano, v. 25, n.
89 (January 1994), pp. 15-17.
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Cardenismo: Juggernaut or Jalopy?
Alan Knight. Journal ojLatin
American Studies, v. 26 (Fall 1994), pp.
73-107. [Discusses Lazaro C ardenas’s
legacy in M exico’s electoral politics.]
Economics and Elections: The
Mexican Case. Michelle BrophyBaerm ann. Social Science Quarterly,
v. 75, n. 1 (March 1994), pp. 125-135.
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Mexico: The Importance o f Being
Ernesto. David C. Scott. Hemisfile,
v. 5, n. 5. (Septem ber-October
1994), pp. 1, 2, 12.
Mexico: Zapatista Thunder.
Lucy Conger. Current History,
v. 93 (March 1994), pp. 115-120.
La organization de las elecciones:
problemas y proyectos de solution.
Jorge Alcocer, Rodrigo Morales, eds.
Mexico, DF: Porrua; 1994. 251 pp.
Symposium: Mexican Elections,
Human Rights, and International
Law (Opposition Views). Loyola
of Los Angeles, International and
Comparative Law Journal, v. 16, n. 2
(February 1994), pp. 299-411.
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Pens and Polls in Nicaragua: An
Analysis o f the 1990 Pre-election
Surveys. K. Bischoping,
H. Schuman. American Journal of
Political Science, v. 36 (May 1992),
pp. 331-350.
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Encuestas y resultados de la election
de 1994. Miguel Basahez. Este Pais,
n. 43 (O ctober 1994), pp. 13-21.
[Compares public opinion polls
with electoral results in Mexico.]
Mexican Revolution? Jerry
Hagstrom. National Journal, v. 26,
no. 30 (July 23, 1994), pp. 1738-1743.
Mexico’s Delayed Democratization.
Wayne A. Cornelius. Foreign Policy, v.
24 n. 95 (Sum m er 1994), pp. 53-71.
[Examines electoral and political re
forms introduced by Carlos Salinas
de Gortari.]
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Elections. The Opposition Returns
to Power. George Priestley. NACLA
Report on the Americas, v. 26 (JanuaryMarch, 1994), pp. 11-14. [Examines
and evaluates Panam a’s May 1994
elections.]
In Panama, No People’s Choice.
Marc Cooper. The Nation,
v. 258, n. 18 (May 9, 1994),
pp. 630-632.
Panama: anos decisivos. Marco A.
Gandasegui. Nueva Sociedad, no. 132
(1994), pp. 4-9.
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Deciphering the National Elections.
Federico Alvarez. NACLA Report on
the Americas, v. 27, n. 5 (March-April
1994), pp. 16-22. [Analyzes the
D ecem ber 5, 1993 Venezuelan
national elections.]
The Deepening o f Democracy in a
Crisis Setting: Political Reform and
the Electoral Process in Venezuela.
Steve Ellner. Journal of Interamerican
Studies and World Affairs, v. 35
(W inter 1993/1994), pp. 1-42.
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Coyuntura electoral centroamericana 1994: El Salvador, Honduras,
Costa Rica, Panama. Instituto
C entroam ericano de Estudios
Politicos. Panorama Centroamericano,
v. 25, n. 94 (June 1994), pp. 1-18.
Enciclopedia electoral latinoamericana y del Caribe. D ieter Nohlen,
ed. San Jose, Costa Rica: Instituto
Latinoam ericano de Derechos
Hum anos; 1993. 684 pp. [Com pre
hensive reference on Latin
American electoral data.]
Latins Vote for Change. Arturo
Porzecanski. Euromoney (June 1994),
pp. 115-117. [Compares recent elec
tions with econom ic policy changes.]
Parties, Elections, and Political
Participation in Latin America.
Jorge I. Dominguez, ed. New York:
Garland, 1994. 424 pp.
Presidential Election Laws and
Multipartism in Latin America. Mark
P. Jones. Political Research Quarterly,
v. 47, n. 1 (March 1994), pp. 41-57.
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